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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“A good name is more desirable than great riches; to be esteemed is better 
than silver or gold.”  
—Proverbs 22:1 (New International Version) 
 
* * * 
 
In 2016, Google received a copy of a Miami-Dade County default judgment in 
MergeworthRX, Inc. v. Ampel, No. 13-13548 CA.1 A certain web page, the judgment 
said, was libelous:  
 
2. The reports posted on or about December 30, 2014 by Defendant, CE-
LIA AMPEL on www.bizjournals.com regarding Plaintiffs, MERGE-
WORTHRX, INC. and STEPHEN CICHY (the “Report”), which is avail-
able at http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/news/2014/12/30/miami-
acquisition-cpmpany-mergeworthrx-to-dissolve.html contains defamatory 
statements regarding Plaintiffs.2 
 
The submitter, therefore, asked Google to “deindex” that page—remove it from 
Google’s indexes, so that people searching for “mergeworthrx” or “stephen cichy” 
or “anthony minnuto” (another name mentioned on the page) wouldn’t see it.3 
 
1 See infra note 5.  
2 Id. 
3 See id. People searching on Google would not see the Daily Business Review article 
mentioned in the default judgment even if they searched for other terms—the deindexing 
was of a page, not by search term—but those are the terms that would have most likely led 
to that page. 
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Google often acts on such requests, as it did on this one, effectively vanishing 
the material from the Internet.4 And why not? It’s a service to Google’s users, who 
presumably want to see true information, not information that’s been found libelous. 
It’s good for the people who were libeled. It can let people at Google feel that they 
are doing good. And it’s respectful of the court judgment, even though it’s not 
strictly required by the judgment. Win-win-win-win. 
Except there was no court order. Case No. 13-13548 CA was a completely dif-
ferent case. Celia Ampel, a reporter for the South Florida Daily Business Review, 
was never sued by MergeworthRX. The supposed judgment submitted to Google 
was a forgery.5 
It was one of over 90 documents submitted to Google (and to other hosting 
platforms) that I believe to be forgeries.6 Google’s well-meaning deindexing policy 
has prompted a rash of such apparent forgeries, some seemingly home brewed and 
some done for money as part of a “reputation management company” business 
model. Such reputation management, whether fraudulent or legitimate, is big busi-
ness.7 
And those over 90 items are just the apparent forgeries, which are possible for 
Google to spot. Google seems to check most of the submissions it gets against court 
records, many of which are available online (as the Miami-Dade County records 
 
4 See How Can I Remove a URL on My Website from the Google Index?, SISTRIX, 
https://www.sistrix.com/ask-sistrix/google-index-google-bot-crawler/how-can-i-remove-a-
url-on-my-website-from-the-google-index/ [https://perma.cc/74VK-QPZ8] (last visited Jan. 
28, 2020). 
5 See Apparently Forged “Final Judgement [sic],” Mergeworthrx, Inc. v. Ampel, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13179239# [https://perma.cc/TKS9-WT6Z] (chang-
ing case number and party names, but using much of the same text as Final Judgment, Allied 
Medical Supply, Inc. v. Bryson, Case No. 13-11166 CA 15 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 11th Cir., Miami-
Dade Cty. Dec. 17, 2013)). See Apparently Forged “Final Judgement [sic],” Mergeworthrx, 
Inc. v. Ampel, supra note 1. Unsurprisingly, there’s no Bluebook rule for governing the ci-
tation of forgeries, so I cite apparently forged orders throughout as “Apparently Forged [pur-
ported order title], [purported case name], [URL where the apparently forged order can be 
found on the Lumen Database].” The case number and jurisdiction aren’t included in the 
citation because most forged orders don’t refer to real cases and the case number is generally 
fictional. That orders were apparent forgeries has been verified by checking the online court 
dockets and calling the corresponding clerk of court’s office. 
6 See infra Appendix A. 
7 See, e.g., Steven W. Giovinco, The Definitive Guide to Online Reputation Manage-
ment Pricing and How They (Should) Be Calculated, RECOVERREPUTATION (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.recoverreputation.com/the-definitive-guide-to-online-reputation-management-
pricing-and-how-they-should-be-calculated/ [https://perma.cc/4B3R-CGNW] (“[M]ost so-
lutions range from taking about 50 to 200 hours to successfully complete over several 
months, or about $5,000 to $20,000.”). 
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are). Most such apparent forgeries, I think, are identified as suspect and thus ignored 
by Google—though, a few, such as the MergeworthRX forgery, do get acted on.8 
But what if a reputation management company engineers a real lawsuit involv-
ing a fake defendant? It sends the court a complaint, purportedly from the plaintiff, 
and an answer admitting liability and stipulating to a judgment, purportedly from 
the defendant. The court is generally happy to accept the apparent stipulation, enter 
the injunction, and get the case off its docket—having no idea, of course, that the 
defendant doesn’t really exist. And Google can’t easily recognize that the defendant 
doesn’t really exist, either. I have found about 30 cases that seem to fit this pattern.9 
Or what if such a company engineers a real libel lawsuit involving a real de-
fendant—but one who has nothing to do with the allegedly libelous post? The com-
pany again sends the court a complaint and an answer with a stipulation, and the 
answer and stipulation are signed by the real defendant; indeed, the defendant’s sig-
nature is even notarized.  
It’s just that the stipulation that the defendant authored the post and admitted 
that the post is false is itself false. But again, the court doesn’t know, so it issues the 
injunction, and Google doesn’t know the injunction is based on a false stipulation, 
either. I have found what appear to be over 30 of those, though here the evidence is 
less open and shut.10 
Or what if the plaintiff doesn’t try hard to find the defendant, but instead gets 
authorization to serve the defendant by publication (which the defendant is nearly 
certain never to learn about), and then gets a default judgment when the defendant 
doesn’t show up? In normal lawsuits, where the point of the judgment is to get dam-
ages or force the defendant to do something, defendants could successfully move to 
set aside such defaults on the grounds that the defendants hadn’t been properly 
served with the lawsuits. But the point of these particular lawsuits is not to get the 
defendants to do something: It’s to persuade Google to do something, and Google 
has no idea whether the plaintiffs had done a good enough job of finding the defend-
ants. I have found over 60 cases like this, though here, too, the evidence is less 
clear.11 
 
8 See infra Part II. Throughout this Article, I focus just on American court orders (or 
documents that purport to be American court orders). I don’t know enough about foreign 
legal systems, including foreign judicial record systems, to efficiently determine which or-
ders are legitimate. I also sometimes mention that Google did deindex a page; that’s based 
on my own records, since once Google is alerted that a court order was improper, it will 
generally reindex the page, not leaving any publicly accessible history of the deindexing and 
reindexing. 
9 See infra Part III; see also infra Appendix B. 
10 See infra Part IV, including the cases mentioned in note 83; see also infra Appendix 
B. 
11 See infra Part V; see also infra Appendix D. Some people who are upset by online 
criticism (libelous or otherwise)—or some reputation management companies—might take 
other illegal steps as well. Some, for instance, may threaten denial-of-service attacks, or even 
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And there’s more: some orders, for instance, were obtained against people who 
wrote comments attached to mainstream media articles but were then submitted to 
Google in an attempt to deindex the whole article, though there is no evidence that 
the underlying article is libelous. Indeed, some of the comments might have actually 
been planted by a reputation management company precisely as an excuse to justify 
the lawsuit.12 
Some other orders include the URLs of government documents or of newspaper 
articles buried in a long list of pages that were supposedly authored by the defendant, 
even though there’s no reason to think the defendant actually posted those pages.13 
Still others use alleged recantations by defendants who had been quoted in newspa-
per articles as a tool for trying to vanish the article as a whole.14 
In all, I found about 700 seemingly legitimate U.S. libel case orders submitted 
to Google for takedown and then forwarded to the Lumen Database from 2012 up 
to mid-October 2016.15 I also found, from the same date range: 
• Over 90 apparently forged orders (my total forgery count includes some 
post-October 2016 submissions),16 
• over 30 possible fake-defendant cases,17  
 
physical violence, unless some material is taken down. See generally United States v. Jahan-
rakhshan, No. 3:17-CR-0414-N, 2018 WL 3455509 (N.D. Tex. July 18, 2018) (discussing 
prosecution of a man who had made both denial-of-service attack threats and bomb threats, 
aimed at removing an online copy of a court opinion in an earlier case in which he was 
involved); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Off., N.D. Tex., Seattle Man 
Arrested for the Attempted Extortion of Leagle.com and Several Other Media Companies 
(July 28, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndtx/pr/seattle-man-arrested-attempted-extor-
tion-leaglecom-and-several-other-media-companies [https://perma.cc/GL86-MYRY] (not-
ing that Jahanrakhshan was also accused of using bomb threats as part of his extortion); 
Indictment, United States v. Pistotnik, No. 6:18-cr-10099-EFM-01-02 (D. Kan. July 17, 
2018) (discussing a similar scheme aimed at forcing an online caselaw repository to remove 
a copy of a court opinion in an earlier bar discipline case involving the defendant, as well as 
postings on the complaint site RipoffReport.com). Others may hack into a site’s computers. 
See Plea Agreement, United States v. Zarokian, No. 2:18-cr-01626-JJT (D. Ariz. Dec. 12, 
2018), ECF No. 12. And others may use fraudulent DMCA copyright takedown notices. See 
infra Section X.E. This article, though, focuses specifically on civil litigation (or purported 
civil litigation). 
12 See infra Part VII. 
13 See infra Part VIII. 
14 See infra Part IX. 
15 My most comprehensive dataset of deindexing requests stored in the Lumen Data-
base comes from this date range. My sense is that the rate of misconduct seems to have 
declined since October 2016, perhaps in part because some of the scams have been exposed; 
but it’s also possible that the scams have simply become harder to detect. See, e.g., discussion 
of Dior v. Xyz, infra Part II, at notes 41–42. 
16 See infra Appendix A. 
17 See infra Appendix B (citing 26 cases that fit one such pattern); text accompanying 
infra notes 83–86 (discussing several more). 
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• likely over 30 apparent fake-claim-of-authorship cases,18  
• about 10 cases aimed at deindexing government documents or newspaper 
articles, which were undoubtedly not written by the defendant,19 and  
• about 60 cases in which there seemed to be no real attempt to track down 
and serve the defendant.20 
That’s a total of over 200 either obviously forged or fraudulent or at least highly 
suspicious cases.21 And it’s hard to tell how many of the 700 seemingly legitimate 
orders might also have involved various kinds of frauds that were just too subtle to 
catch. I’m sure there are many perfectly proper libel judgments that lead to deindex-
ing requests. But many deindexing orders are suspect in various ways. I go through 
the details of these shenanigans—and others—in the pages below, and then turn to 
a few implications.22 
1. Most obviously, this is a reminder not to trust apparent court orders until you 
check them against court records. Say, for instance, you run a website, and someone 
sends you an order declaring certain material on the site to be libelous—an order 
addressed not to you, but to one of your users—and asks you to take down the al-
leged libel. Don’t assume the order is legitimate: Verify whether it actually appears 
in the court docket, and, if possible, check with the author of the material (if you can 
identify and reach the author) to see if the order may have been fraudulently ob-
tained. 
2. Likewise, if you are a lawyer and a prospective client asks you to file pre-
pared documents—such as stipulations or affidavits—you should be careful. If the 
documents are fraudulent, you might end up tainted by the fraud, even if you hadn’t 
known about it.23 
3. This is also a reminder of the value of American courts’ policy of keeping 
records presumptively open, even when the records involve relatively small-time 
low-profile litigation. If such records were presumptively sealed, fraud would be 
even easier to hide. 
4. Sometimes some orders are sealed—very rarely in libel cases, but often in 
criminal expungement cases. People whose records have been expunged sometimes 
send those expungement orders to Google and to others to try to get mugshots, news-
 
18 See infra Appendix C. 
19 See infra Part VIII. 
20 See infra Appendix D.  
21 Not all 200-plus cases led to Google deindexing requests. Some didn’t lead to a judg-
ment; some were submitted to web site hosts with requests to remove the allegedly libelous 
material; and some might have stalled for other reasons. 
22 See infra Part X. 
23 For instance, the Arizona Bar disciplined two lawyers for negligently failing to verify 
materials they had received from clients or from third parties—materials that proved to be 
forged or fraudulent. In re Warner, No. PDJ 2018-9012, at 2–3 (Ariz. Presiding Disciplinary. 
J. July 30, 2018); In re Kelly, No. PDJ 2018-9012 at 1–3 (Ariz. Presiding Disciplinary J. July 
30, 2018). 
2021] SHENANIGANS (INTERNET TAKEDOWN EDITION) 243 
 
paper police blotter entries, and even normal newspaper articles deindexed or ed-
ited.24 To my knowledge, Google doesn’t act on such expungement orders, but some 
newspapers and other sites might be willing to. 
Yet, if the order is sealed—or if the file is entirely destroyed, which is what 
happens in some jurisdictions—the recipient can’t readily confirm that the order is 
authentic. The most it can get from the court system is “that file is sealed.” If courts 
do want to operate using sealed expungement orders, then they need to create a ver-
ification system where someone who has a copy of what purports to be such an order 
can confirm whether that order is identical to the one in the court file. 
5. Some anti-libel injunctions aim to bind search engines, hosting companies 
(such as WordPress or Yelp), domain name registrars, and the like—even when 
those entities were not parties to the case. In its fractured 3–1–3 decision in Hassell 
v. Bird, the California Supreme Court recently held that such injunctions are imper-
missible.25  
The magnitude of possible frauds in such cases helps show that the Hassell 
plurality and the concurrence were correct: Online service providers, such as Yelp 
and Google, that get these orders are the first line of defense against fraudulent be-
havior, so long as they have no legal obligation to comply with such orders issued 
against third parties. The service providers can exercise their discretion to conclude 
that some orders appear untrustworthy. They can demand more documentation from 
people who submit the orders. And if their concerns about the orders are not ade-
quately resolved, they can decline to act on the orders. 
6. Congress is considering whether to strip Internet platforms of libel imunity 
if they fail to take down material after being sent 
 
[a] copy of the order of a Federal or State court under which the content 
or activity was determined to violate Federal law or State defamation law, 
and to the extent available, any references substantiating the validity of the 
order, such as the web addresses of public court docket information.26 
 
But the cases I discuss below show that such orders are not trustworthy: Even if they 
aren’t forged, there is no way of figuring out if they are the result of some other 
fraud—or are otherwise unreliable, for instance because they have been obtained as 
a result of a default judgment, with no real attempt to locate and serve the defendant. 
The orders may purport to “determine[]” that certain “content” “violate[s] . . . defa-
mation law,” but that determination, even if fair as between the parties, ought not be 
 
24 See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Mum’s the Word: Secret Proceeding About Se-




25 Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776, 779 (Cal. 2018). 
26 Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act (PACT Act), S. 4066, 
116th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 6(a) (2020). 
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used to determine the rights and responsibilities of third parties who were not in-
volved in the litigation.  
 
II.  FORGERIES 
 
Michael Arnstein ran the Natural Sapphire Company. Upset at some allegedly 
libelous criticisms of his company, he sued and got a court order requiring a defend-
ant to take down those criticisms. He then had the order sent to Google, asking 
Google to deindex those URLs.27 So far, so good. 
But Arnstein was, unsurprisingly, not thrilled with the cost and delay involved 
in litigation. So when he found other URLs that he thought were defamatory, he 
didn’t pay his lawyer to go back to court to get new orders. Instead, he created 11 
new orders himself—he took the original order, edited out the old URLs, added the 
new URLs, and changed the order date.28 Google did apparently deindex some ma-
terial, relying on some of these forgeries. And Arnstein made his rationale clear, in 
an e-mail that eventually surfaced: 
 
[N]o bullshit: if I could do it all over again I would have found another 
court order injunction for removal of links (probably something that can 
be found online pretty easily) made changes in photoshop to show the links 
that I wanted removed and then sent to ‘removals@google.com’ as a pdf—
showing the court order docket number, the judges [sic] signature—but 
with the new links put in. google isn’t checking this stuff; that’s the bottom 
line b/c I spent $30,000 fuckin thousand dollars and nearly 2 fuckin years 
to do what legit could have been done for about 6 hours of searching and 
photoshop by a guy for $200., all in ONE DAY . . . 29 
 
Of course, the downside to doing it Arnstein’s way is that it’s a federal felony. Arn-
stein was discovered, prosecuted, and sentenced to nine months in prison.30 
 
27 See Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Transpacific Software Pvt 
Ltd., No. 11-CV-5079 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2012) (a real court order); https://www.lumenda-
tabase.org/notices/12549270 [https://perma.cc/VL4M-WCJ2] (reporting that this order was 
submitted to Google). 
28 Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Guilty Plea for ‘Brazen Scheme to Submit Counterfeit Fed-
eral Court Orders to Google,’ WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2017, 6:53 AM), http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/09/19/guilty-plea-for-brazen-scheme-to-
submit-counterfeit-federal-court-orders-to-google/ [https://perma.cc/Q4ME-KFKS]; see 
also infra Appendix A, No. 38–48. 
29 Complaint at 5–6, United States v. Arnstein, No. 1:17-mj-01870-UA (S.D.N.Y. filed 
Mar. 15, 2017). 
30 Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1–2, United States v. Arnstein, No. 1:17-cr-00570 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2018); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Off., 
S.D.N.Y., Manhattan Businessman Sentenced to Nine Months in Prison for Forging Federal 
Court Orders to Remove Negative Reviews from Internet Search Results (Oct. 19, 2018), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-businessman-sentenced-nine-months-
prison-forging-federal-court-orders-remove [https://perma.cc/97AH-XNX3]. 
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These 11 orders were among over 90 apparent forgeries (listed in Appendix A) 
submitted by various people that were aimed at this sort of deindexing (or, in a few 
cases, outright removal). The broader range of forgeries was aimed at hiding a wide 
range of materials. Some of the most interesting ones included attempts to deindex: 
• criticisms of an Indonesian billionaire, posted by his niece who was accus-
ing him of (among other things) cheating her side of the family out of the 
family fortune;31 
• newspaper articles about a sports agent who had represented prominent 
Olympians, such as gymnasts Gabby Douglas and Laurie Hernandez, but 
who had gotten bad publicity when her nanny sued her and her husband for 
alleged assault and racist insults;32 
• copies of court decisions in a case a man had brought against his ex-em-
ployer;33 
• newspaper articles about the prosecution of a cyberstalker;34 
• online posts critical of several Scientology-linked drug and alcohol rehab 
centers;35 
 
31 Apparently Forged “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Permanent In-
junction,” Asia Pacific Resources Int’l Holdings v. “Neomi Wendy Chen” (on file with au-
thor) (using the same docket number as the real case of Wild Strawberry Entertainment Co. 
v. John Doe, No. A1407255 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. judgment and injunction 
granted Mar. 30, 2015), and the same docket number as the apparently forged order in Tran-
quil Rehab Swiss SA v. Deathhamster, infra note 35); see also infra Appendix A, No. 78.  
32 Apparently Forged “Judgement [sic] Entry,” State v. Mazer, http://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/17665123 [https://perma.cc/DU4F-D2TL] (purporting to be an order in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, but using the name of the Ohio 
state judge, Hon. Donald Oda, and docket number in State of Ohio v. Aukerman, No. 
14CR29792 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Warren Cty. filed Jan. 21, 2014), discussed infra at note 39); 
see also infra Appendix A, No. 35. 
33 Apparently Forged “Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief,” Manley 
v. NAVMAR, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/17164539 [https://perma.cc/6G5B-
E88U] (copying the caption, case number, and Judge’s signature from Order Denying Plain-
tiff’s Motion and Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Manley v. Navmar Applied Sci-
ences Corp., No. 2:12-cv-05493 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013)); see also Apparently Forged “Or-
der Removal of Defamatory Contents on Internet,” Manley v. Ellarbee and Thompson, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/17164539 [https://perma.cc/6G5B-E88U] (copying 
the stamp and case number of Complaint at 1, Manley v. Lockheed Martin, No. 1-17-cv-
1320 (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 13, 2017)); see also infra Appendix A, No. 32. 
34 Apparently Forged “Agreed Order of Acknowledgement [sic],” People of Illinois v. 
Cordogan, http://lumendatabase.org/notices/13555164 [https://perma.cc/3AQQ-TU9T] (us-
ing a date stamp with apparent alterations, and using purported docket numbers 12-CR-7171-
7183, 12-CR-9649-9660, and 12-CR-6978 for the Illinois Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Criminal Division, which court staff confirmed via phone do not match any of their dockets); 
see also infra Appendix A, no. 63. 
35 See Apparently Forged “Amended Final Default Judgment,” Narconon Rehab Servs. 
LLC v. Doe, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12960667 [https://perma.cc/HC93-PCF5] 
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• a real estate transaction listing on the blockshopper.com site, mentioning a 
particular person’s home;36 
• an online newspaper article critical of a volunteer New Britain (Conn.) city 
commissioner;37 
 
(showing a purported case number, 2016CV258140, that does not match any court docu-
ments as confirmed via phone by the court in Fulton County, Georgia); Apparently Forged 
“Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Permanent Injunction,” Tranquil Rehab 
Swiss SA v. Deathhamster, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12987034 [https://perma.cc/NY5 
C-NQFX] (using the same docket number and jurisdiction as Wild Strawberry Entertainment 
Co. v. John Doe, No. A1407255 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. judgment & in-junction 
granted Mar. 30, 2015) and same docket number as the apparently forged Asia Pacific Re-
sources Int’l Holdings v. “Neomi Wendy Chen,” see supra note 31); Apparently Forged 
“Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment,” SPR, Inc. v. Doe, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12928496 [https://perma.cc/7QNL-H84M] (copying the case 
number and caption of Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment at 
1, Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty., July 7, 2016), vacated 
Oct. 20, 2016); Apparently Forged “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Perma-
nent Injunction,” Tranquility Rehab Swiss SA v. Billibob, https://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/13038356 [https://perma.cc/56Y4-FVA7] (using the same docket number 
and jurisdiction as Wild Strawberry Entertainment Co. v. John Doe, No. A1407255 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. judgment and injunction granted Mar. 30, 2015), and using the 
same docket number and spelling errors as in Asia Pacific Resources Int’l Holdings v. “Ne-
omi Wendy Chen,” supra, note 31 and Tranquil Rehab v. Deathhamster, supra note 35); see 
also Gary Baum, Scientology Anti-Drug Program: Fabricated Court Orders Suggest At-
tempt to Silence Critics, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 9, 2017, 6:30 AM), http://www.holly-
woodreporter.com/news/scientology-anti-drug-program-fabricated-court-orders-suggest-at-
tempt-silence-critics-1027738 [https://perma.cc/CRA3-TUUB]. 
36 Apparently Forged “Memorandum Opinion and [Order],” Katelanis v. Blockshopper 
LLC, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/16161042 [https://perma.cc/AG3G-8H6P] 
(taking the docket number and court jurisdiction from Essex Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Oak Lawn, 
No. 1:14-cv-04572 (N.D. Ill. filed June 17, 2014), using the name of a real judge, John W. 
Darrah, from N.D. Ill. but who was not assigned to docket No. 1:14-cv-04572, and also in-
cluding many typographical errors). This document lists the same purported judge as in Haas 
v. Berriault, infra Appendix A, No. 22 and note 37, and in State v. Pennant, infra note 47, 
Appendix A No. 23). 
37 Apparently Forged “Memorandum Opinion and Order,” Haas v. Berriault, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/14045627 [https://perma.cc/5HYJ-S9ND] (purport-
ing to be issued by the Conn. Super. Ct., using the name of a real federal judge from the U.S. 
Dist. Ct. for the N.D. Ill., John W. Darrah; this is the same judge’s name used in the appar-
ently forged documents in Katelanis v. Blockshopper LLC, supra note 36 and infra Appen-
dix A, No. 36, and in State v. Pennant, infra note 47 and Appendix A No. 23); see also 
Eugene Volokh, Apparent Forged Court Order for the Benefit of a New Britain (Conn.) 
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• an online magazine article discussing the past criminal convictions of a Los 
Angeles hotel executive;38 
• one of my own posts about an earlier prosecution for one such forgery.39 
Some of the forgeries are obvious on their face, at least to those who know what to 




The forger apparently didn’t know that there are no Circuit Court Judges in Los 
Angeles Superior Court (though the title is common in other state trial court sys-
tems). But other forgeries are much more realistic, for instance:41 
 
38 Apparently Forged “Minute Order,” California v. Farzam, http://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/15936937 [https://perma.cc/VK6H-DLBX] (apparently forging order to 
seal the entire record on defendant’s ex parte application). 
39 See Apparently Forged “Judgement [sic] and Entry and Order Granting Motion to 
Seal Record,” Ohio v. Aukerman, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/14849831 
[https://perma.cc/PM9R-9TZM] (purporting to issue an order in July 2017 to seal the record 
of the real case of State v. Aukerman, No. 14CR2972 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Warren Cty. filed 
Jan. 21, 2014), and purporting to find defamatory several URLs, including a Volokh Con-
spiracy post from Apr. 1, 2017). Lumen notes on these documents: “Judge Oda has informed 
Lumen that this order is not authentic; he did not make any findings regarding any URL 
webpages that were alleged to be defamatory, nor did he order anything be removed from 
the Internet.” Id. For a discussion of the preceding and related 2013 forgery and 2014 pros-
ecution of Mr. Aukerman in Volusia County, Florida, see infra notes 46 and 213.  
40 Apparently Forged “Order Granting Motion for Injunction,” Morris v. Bail Bond 
City, LLC, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/12886152 [https://perma.cc/KHX6-
V3WP] (using improper case number and listing purported judge as “Pamela J.L. Brown, 
Circuit Court Judge,” which is a title that does not exist in this court). 
41 Apparently Forged “Judgment,” Dior v. XYZ, http://www.lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/13179169 [https://perma.cc/RQW5-Q4FE] (using the case number from the real case 
of Argyropoulos v. Doe, No. BC 558812 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Oct. 27, 2015)); see also 
infra Appendix A, No. 6. 




(Note that there is no reason to think that this forgery was the work of the lawyer 
cited in the caption—once someone has decided to forge everything else, why not 
fake the lawyer’s name as well?) 
Only examining the real court records can confirm whether the document is 
authentic. Fortunately, the Los Angeles Superior Court has many of its records 
online, and they show that this case number corresponds to a completely different 
case, and there is no case involving a Jag Sitra Dior.42 Unfortunately, other courts 
(such as those in Plumas County and Mono County, where five of the apparently 
 
42 Judgment, Argyropolous v. Doe, No. 558812 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Oct. 27, 
2015). Many parts of the Dior forgery appear to have been copied from the Argyropolous 
judgment. 
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forged orders are purportedly from43) don’t have online records systems.44 Checking 
on cases from such courts can require ordering documents by mail, or, in some 
courts, even sending a courier service. 
Two federal cases involving such forgeries have led to prosecutions and con-
victions,45 though the first wasn’t accompanied with any publicity that might have 
deterred other forgers. Five other state cases led to a conviction for contempt of 
court,46 a forgery conviction,47 a forgery prosecution that led to diversion for mental 
 
43 See Apparently Forged “Default Judgment,” Khorasani v. Sampson, http://lumenda-
tabase.org/?sid=1037493 [https://perma.cc/BJS8-8WP8] (using improper case number; no 
clerk by the name of Hector Gonzalez, Jr. has worked at Calif. Super. Ct., Mono Cty. Emails 
from Lester Perpall, CEO and Kay Richmond, Deputy Clerk, Mono Cty. Super. Ct., respec-
tively, to Utah Law Review staff, Apr. 8, 2020 (on file with Utah Law Review)); Apparently 
Forged “Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction,” Giunta v. Bosley, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=1896816 [https://perma.cc/U4YU-6ZTV] (same); Apparently Forged “Final 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Increase Visibility Inc., v. Ruiz,” http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2164422 [https://perma.cc/JU7G-C7PX]; Increase Visibility v. Thomas, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2174997 [https://perma.cc/XM9K-DPP8]; Apparently 
Forged “Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction,” Schwartzapfel v. Goldstein et al., 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1657779 [https://perma.cc/A7UZ-BUET]. 
44 See, e.g., Superior Court, County of Plumas, http://www.plumascourt.ca.gov/in-
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/4YKK-ZP2Z] (“Record Searches” button leads to a “Record 
Search Request Information Sheet,” http://www.plumascourt.ca.gov/Record%20Search%20 
Request.pdf, which requires a mailed request—not by fax or phone—and says that “[t]ypi-
cally, a search request is completed in 5 to 7 business days . . . from the date the court receives 
the request”). 
45 One is United States v. Arnstein, No. 1:17-mj-01870-UA (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2017), 
Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Arnstein, No. 1:17-cr-00570 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 
31, 2018), discussed at notes 27–30. For the other one, see Sealed Complaint, United States 
v. Lichterman, No. 1:14-mj-02735-UA (S.D.N.Y filed Dec. 5, 2014) and Judgment in a 
Criminal Case, United States v. Lichterman, No. 1:15-cr-00302-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 
2016) (defendant pleaded guilty to “Forging A Court Seal”). 
46 Judgment and Sentence for Indirect Criminal Contempt, Aukerman v. Adams, No. 
2013-33765-FMCI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Volusia Cty. Feb. 5, 2014) (sentencing defendant to thirty 
days in jail). This judgment appears to stem from the Apparently Forged “Entry and Order 
Granting Motion to Seal Record,” Aukerman v. Adams, https://www.lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/13178241 [per-ma.cc/4XNY-T2C2] (purporting to seal record in the same Volusia 
County Aukerman case); see also infra Appendix A, No. 60. For a discussion of a related 
apparent forgery involving Aukerman in 2017 in Ohio, see supra note 39 and accompanying 
text. 
47 State v. Pennant, No. T19R-CR18-0111799-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2019) (sen-
tencing defendant to one year in jail—though the length of the sentence might have stemmed 
from defendant’s having a longer criminal history—for forging Conn. Super. Ct. order, see 
infra Appendix A, No. 23, which named the purported judge as “John W. Darrah,” who is 
not a Connecticut state judge, but was a federal judge in Illinois who died in 2017). The same 
judge’s name was used in the apparently forged documents in Katelanis v. Blockshopper 
LLC, supra note 36 and infra Appendix A, No. 36, and Haas v. Berriault, infra Appendix A, 
No. 22 and supra note 37. 
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health treatment,48 a recently filed forgery prosecution,49 and a recently filed bar 
investigation and complaint.50 Though prosecutors or judges were eventually alerted 
to the remaining forgeries, those forgeries didn’t lead to prosecutions. 
Many of these forgeries, especially the most amateurish-looking ones, were 
likely done by the beneficiaries themselves. But the connections among some of the 
fake orders suggest that there are forgery businesses who do this for clients.51 Sev-
eral apparent forgeries that purport to be from Hamilton County, Ohio, for instance, 
 
48 People v. Farzam, No. LACBA476050-01 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. filed Nov. 15, 
2019); Minute Order, id. (Mar. 4, 2021) (ordering mental health diversion, and ordering de-
fendant “not to forge any court documents”). 
49 State v. Holt (N.H. Dist. Ct. filed Jan. 25, 2021), https://reason.com/wp-content/up-
loads/2021/02/HoltCriminalComplaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/CJ9K-62C9]; N.H. Dep’t of 
Justice, Arrest of Heidi L. Holt for Tampering with Public Records or Information and For-
gery, Jan. 28, 2021, https://www.doj.nh.gov/news/2021/20210128-holt-arrest.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8LRE-CVFL]. 
50 Complaint, State Bar v. Michaelides, no. OBC20-0444 (Nev. State Bar S. Nev. Dis-
cip. Bd. Oct. 13, 2020). 
51 Compare Apparently Forged “Amended Final Default Judgment,” Narconon Rehab 
Servs. LLC v. Doe, supra note 35, with Apparently Forged “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] 
and Entry of Permanent Injunction,” Tranquil Rehab Swiss SA v. Deathhamster, supra note 
35 (both aimed at deindexing criticisms of Narconon International). Compare Apparently 
Forged “Agreed Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction,” Am. Truck Group, LLC v. Ro-
driguez, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2362326 [https://perma.cc/7PAH-BW2Y] (pur-
ported case number, L-8463014, and case name appear not to exist in court records; docu-
ment purports to be from Chancery Division, but “L” in case number corresponds to Civil 
Part), with Apparently Forged “Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent Injunc-
tion,” Am. Truck Group, LLC v. “Your Savior,” http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2350253 
[https://perma.cc/8VXM-ZSPY] (using same docket number as Adam Meer v. Procter & 
Gamble Co DBA Old Spice, No. A-1804003 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. filed July 26, 
2018)) (both aimed at deindexing criticisms of American Truck Group). Compare Appar-
ently Forged “Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment,” SPR, 
Inc., v. Doe, supra note 35, with Apparently Forged “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and 
Entry of Permanent Injunction,” Tranquility Rehab Swiss SA v. Billibob, supra note 35 (both 
listing RipoffReport.com URL). Compare Apparently Forged “Ex Parte Temporary Injunc-
tion” at 11–12, Moore & Efloortrade, LLC v. Steinberg & Rothman, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2140733 [https://perma.cc/N4K3-S9DB] (specifically the URL mentioning 
“Intacapital”), with Apparently Forged “Order Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Per-
manent Injunction,” Intacapital Swiss SA v. “IRLGlegal” (on file with author) (apparently 
based on Intacapital Swiss SA v. IRGLegal, No. A-1407254 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton 
Cty. Apr. 17, 2015), but using a later judgment date than last item in docket, and including 
URLs that do not appear in the actual court-entered judgment). Some of the forgeries are 
also based on the possible fake-defendant orders discussed in Part III. Apparently Forged 
“Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment,” SPR, Inc. v. Doe, su-
pra note 35; Apparently Forged “Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final 
Judgment,” Maziar v. Garcia, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13449795 [https://perma.cc/6V 
3K-TNTR] (using much of the same text as Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction 
and Final Judgment, Smith v. Garcia, No. 16-144 S, 2017 WL 412722 (D.R.I. Apr. 22, 
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look very similar,52 and a contract signed by one of the ostensible plaintiffs shows 
that the ostensible plaintiff had hired a company called Web Savvy to do something 
about critical posts, for a fee of $3,750 per post.53 (The ostensible plaintiff reported 
that she had no idea that Web Savvy would do this through forgery, but instead 
thought it was a reputable company that had some legitimate way of doing what it 
promised.54) A CBS News investigation that was based largely on the research in 
 
2016)). And one of the apparent forgeries seemed to be for the benefit of the same person 
who was the plaintiff in one of the California-notarization orders discussed in Part V. See 
infra Part V; Apparently Forged “Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction,” Schwartzapfel 
v. Goldstein, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1657779 [https://perma.cc/7FYJ-DT66]; Final 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Schwartzapfel v. Guidry, No. 2014-42698 (Tex. Harris 
Cty. Dist. Ct. July 25, 2014). 
52 See, e.g., Apparently Forged “Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent In-
junction,” Am. Truck Group, LLC v. “Your Savior,” supra note 51; Apparently Forged “Or-
der Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent Injunction,” Clarkson v. “ALI191,” http://lu-
mendatabase.org/notices/14041069 [https://perma.cc/JUD8-T9FA] (using the docket num-
ber from City of Cincinnati v. Tucker, No. A0903003 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. 
judgment filed May 1, 2015)); Apparently Forged “Agreed Judgment and Permanent Injuc-
tion [sic],” Friedman v. Wright, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2368931 [https://perma.cc/ 
B8BF-TRQ9] (using the docket number from Hoskins v. Admin. Bureau of Workers Comp., 
No. A1605371 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. dismissed Nov. 30, 2017)); Apparently 
Forged “Order Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Permanent Injunction,” IntaCapital 
Swiss SA v. “IRLGLegal” (on file with author) (apparently based on Intacapital Swiss SA 
v. IRGLegal, No. A-1407254 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. Apr. 17, 2015), but using a 
later judgment date than last item in docket, and including URLs that do not appear in the 
actual court-entered judgment); Apparently Forged “Order Granting Judgment and Entry of 
Permanent Injunction,” Noie v. Seabrook, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2348633 
[https://perma.cc/NQ2Q-BR7R] (using the case number and jurisdiction from McFarland v. 
Proctor & Gamble Co., A1804009 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. filed July 26, 2018)); 
Apparently Forged “Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent Injunction,” Soba 
Living, LLC v. Will, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2352943 [https://perma.cc/YP39-ZZ8L] 
(using the case number and jurisdiction from Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v Bertram, No. 
A1304018 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. amended judgment Aug. 10, 2016)); Appar-
ently Forged “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Permanent Injunction,” Tranquil Rehab 
Swiss SA v. Deathhamster, supra note 35; Apparently Forged “Orders Granting Judgement 
[sic] and Entry of Permanent Injunction,” Tranquility Rehab Swiss SA v. Billibob, supra 
note 35; Apparently Forged “Order Granting Judgment and Permanent Injunction,” Vehicle-
history, LLC v. Edingeorgia, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2359742 [https://perma.cc/N9 
4T-PQ5F] (purported case number A2104005 does not appear in docket searches in Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty.). 
53 See Gary Baum, Scientology Anti-Drug Program: Fabricated Court Orders Suggest 
Attempt to Silence Critics, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Aug. 9, 2017, 6:30 AM), https://www.holly-
woodreporter.com/news/scientology-anti-drug-program-fabricated-court-orders-suggest-at-
tempt-silence-critics-1027738 [https://perma.cc/56TF-AEBU]; Reputation Management 
Agreement Between Web Savvy LLC and Client (available from author) (showing that Web 
Savvy LLC had promised to “work to de-index” the links that ended up in one of the forged 
Hamilton County orders). 
54 Baum, supra note 53. 
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this Part likewise appears to have identified John Rooney of Web Savvy as the per-
son behind that order.55 
 
III.  STIPULATED INJUNCTIONS INVOLVING APPARENTLY FAKE DEFENDANTS 
 
In August 2016, I got an e-mail from an acquaintance of mine, Matthew Chan. 
An odd thing had happened, he wrote: Yelp had informed him that it was considering 
deleting a customer review of his because of a court judgment that the review was 
libelous.56 Indeed, this judgment was based on a stipulation, in which he had sup-
posedly admitted the libel:57 
  
 
55 See Jim Axelrod & Andy Bast, CBS News Investigation Finds Fraudulent Court Or-




56 E-mail from Matthew Chan, to Eugene Volokh (Aug. 11, 2016) (on file with the 
author). 
57 Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Patel v. Chan, 
No. 24-C-16-003573 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cty. July 26, 2016), vacated (July 7, 2017). 







But, Chan told me, the lawsuit had been filed in Baltimore against a “Mathew 
Chan” who was supposedly in Maryland. Both the Chan I was talking to (who wrote 
the Yelp review) and the plaintiff—Mitul Patel, a dentist whom Chan had criticized 
254 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
in his Yelp review—lived in Georgia. Indeed, because Chan had been a patient of 
Patel’s,58 Patel surely knew that Chan was in Georgia. 
Now the court order, it turns out, was real: If Yelp had sent a document retrieval 
service to get the Baltimore court records,59 it would have found the original of the 
order. But the Baltimore Mathew Chan appears to have been fake. There was no 
Mathew Chan connected to the address listed in the court docket, and there is no 
evidence that any such person ever signed any documents in the case. Indeed, when 
the apparent fraud was uncovered, the plaintiff himself denied that he had ever au-
thorized the lawsuit.60 
Searching through Bloomberg Law dockets for some of the boilerplate from 
the Baltimore order eventually uncovered 26 cases that all fit this profile.61 Of those, 
23 (including Patel v. Chan) listed the defendant’s address. A friend of mine referred 
me to Giles Miller of Lynx Investigations, an experienced private investigator, who 
agreed to research those defendants pro bono—and none of those 23 ostensible de-
fendants had any visible connection to the addresses listed for them.62 
Paul Alan Levy of Public Citizen moved to intervene in one of those 23 cases, 
Smith v. Garcia, filed in Rhode Island federal court.63 (That case was aimed at dein-
dexing consumer finance advice posts at GetOutofDebt.org, a serious financial ad-
vice site run by an organization that Levy had represented before and that he repre-
sented in his motion to intervene.64) The District Court eventually vacated the earlier 
order “[i]n light of the evidence that the Consent Judgment was procured through 
fraud on the Court.”65  
 
58 E-mail from Matthew Chan, supra note 56. 
59 When I tried to get court records from the Baltimore Circuit Court, I found that the 
court wouldn’t send them by mail or e-mail, even for a payment. The docket sheets are avail-
able online, but not the documents. Other Maryland courts are more accommodating: They 
charge a modest fee, but they take credit card payments by phone and then send the material 
by mail. 
60 Motion to Intervene, Motion to Strike Judgment, and Answer to Defendant Mathew 
Chan’s Motion to Vacate Consent Judgment/Order, Patel v. Chan, No. 24-C-16-003573 (Md. 
Cir. Ct. Balt. Cty. Sept. 21, 2016). 
61 This was done using Bloomberg Law searches for phrases that appeared in the Patel 
papers, such as “Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment” and “Dated, so respect-
fully.” Though such phrases could of course appear in unrelated cases, looking through re-
sults revealed that many of the orders that use one of the phrases also use several others, and 
thus appear to come from the same source (even though all are ostensibly pro se lawsuits). 
For a listing of these cases, see infra Appendix B.  
62 Eugene Volokh & Paul Alan Levy, Opinion, Dozens of Suspicious Court Cases, with 
Missing Defendants, Aim at Getting Web Pages Taken Down or Deindexed, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 10, 2016, 6:01 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspir-
acy/wp/2016/10/10/dozens-of-suspicious-court-cases-with-missing-defendants-aim-at-get-
ting-web-pages-taken-down-or-deindexed/ [https://perma.cc/P24R-GV65].  
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Chan eventually got the Patel v. Chan judgment vacated, too, litigating the mat-
ter pro se.66 Following the press coverage of these orders,67 a court in a Philadelphia 
case sua sponte vacated an injunction that fit a similar pattern.68 In another similar 
Philadelphia case, the supposedly stipulated motion for an injunction was denied.69 
A Florida case with similar boilerplate to Patel v. Chan, which was pending at the 
time, was voluntarily dropped the day that Levy’s and my Washington Post blog 
post about the cases went up.70 
The Rhode Island litigation also uncovered who was responsible for Smith v. 
Garcia: Richart Ruddie, owner of the reputation management companies SEO Pro-
file Defender Network LLC (often just called Profile Defenders) and RIR1984 
LLC.71 Profile Defenders had promised “guarantee[d] removal”72 (no payment if the 
removal does not happen) to its customers—a risky guarantee for potentially lengthy 
and expensive court processes. 
Ruddie was ultimately sanctioned $71,000, chiefly consisting of Myvesta’s le-
gal fees.73 As part of a settlement agreement, Ruddie also agreed to ask Florida and 
Maryland courts to vacate three other court orders that called for the deindexing of 
Myvesta posts related to Smith’s companies, Smith v. Levin, Financial Rescue LLC 
 
66 Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Consent Judgment, Patel v. Chan, No. 
24-C-16-003573 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. Cty. July 7, 2017).  
67 See Volokh & Levy, supra note 62. 
68 See Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Callagy v. 
Roffman, No. 160603108 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. July 7, 2016), vacated Oct. 20, 2016. 
The proceedings to vacate the order began a month before the press coverage, possibly be-
cause I had informed the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas of the possible problem. 
69 Murtagh v. Reynolds, No. 160901262 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. Oct. 26, 2016) 
(injunction denied). 
70 Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief, Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-
CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cty. filed Aug. 17, 2016); Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal Without Prejudice, Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mi-
ami-Dade Cty. Oct. 10, 2016). 
71 Eugene Volokh, Apparently-Fake-Defendant Libel Lawsuit Watch: Richart Ruddie 
& SEO Profile Defender Network LLC Paying $71,000 to Settle Claim, WASH. POST (Mar. 
14, 2017, 2:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03 
/14/apparently-fake-defendant-libel-lawsuit-watch-richart-ruddie-seo-profile-defender-net-
work-llc-paying-71000-to-settle-claim/ [https://perma.cc/233N-W36P] [hereinafter Volokh, 
Apparently-Fake-Defendant]; Sanctions Order, Smith v. Garcia, No. 1:16-cv-00144-S-LDA 
(D.R.I. Apr. 13, 2017), ECF No. 16. 
72 See, e.g., Press Release from Profile Defenders, Profile Defenders Lawsuit Removal 
Service Takes Down Defamatory Webpages, PRESS RELEASE JET (Nov. 14, 2015), 
http://pressreleasejet.com/newsreleases/2015/profile-defenders-lawsuit-removal-service-
takes-down-defamatory-webpages [https://perma.cc/K46J-6PTK] (“A defamation removal 
law firm and online reputation management company combine. Profile Defenders Lawsuit 
Removal service honors a guarantee to take down and defamatory or unwanted webpages 
from search results as long as they meet specific criteria. A guarantee is priced in and year 
to date out of 375 cases only 1 has not been successful.”). 
73 Volokh, Apparently-Fake-Defendant, supra note 71; Sanctions Order, Smith v. Gar-
cia, No. 1:16-cv-00144-S-LDA (D.R.I. Apr. 13, 2017), ECF No. 16. 
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v. Smith, and Rescue One Financial LLC v. Doe.74 In Smith v. Levin, court records 
included the ostensible address of purported defendant in each case, Levin, but no-
one with that name could be found at that address.75 I confirmed through independ-
ent sources that some of the other cases that fit the same modus operandi as Smith v. 
Garcia were likewise filed through Ruddie.  
Smith v. Garcia is the only case in which there was an express judicial finding 
of shenanigans. Nonetheless, there was a total of 26 cases (including Smith v. Garcia 
and Patel v. Chan) that shared the same boilerplate; in several of those, I got confir-
mation from sources that Richart Ruddie or his companies were involved. In 23 of 
26, defendants’ addresses were included,76 and all 23 of those addresses could not 
be linked to the defendants’ names by the private investigator I mentioned above. It 
thus appears that at least a considerable number of the 26 cases likely involved the 
same kind of trickery. The pattern in Smith v. Garcia and Patel v. Chan thus appears 
to have been: 
1. The plaintiff hired a reputation management company to get online criti-
cism of plaintiff removed. 
2. The reputation management company filed a libel lawsuit in the plaintiff’s 
name against a fake defendant, seeking an injunction. 
3. The complaint was accompanied with a stipulation supposedly signed by 
the defendant (but in reality, produced by the company itself).  
4. The hope—often realized—was that the trial judge would see that the par-
ties agree on the injunction, and therefore would sign the injunction with-
out much further scrutiny. Indeed, in two cases, judges entered permanent 
 
74 Settlement Agreement, Smith v. Garcia, No. 1:16-cv-00144-S-LDA, at 1 (D.R.I. Feb. 
28, 2017), ECF No. 15-2; see also Paul Alan Levy, Richart Ruddie Settles Anti-SLAPP 
Claims, Makes Restitution; but the Guilty Companies Remain Unpunished, CONSUMER L. & 
POL’Y BLOG (Mar. 14, 2017), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2017/03/richart-ruddie-set-
tles-anti-slapp-claims-makes-restitution-but-the-guilty-companies-remain-unpunishe.html 
[https://perma.cc/LS85-Z5TY]; Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Consent Judgment Pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 2-535(b) and to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint with Prejudice, Smith & Res-
cue One Financial, LLC v. Levin, 24-C-15-004789 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Oct. 16, 2015); 
Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Final Default Judgment, Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. 
P. 1.540, and to Dismiss this Case with Prejudice, Financial Rescue, LLC v. Smith, No. 15-
006119-CI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas Cty. May 19, 2017); Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Final 
Default Judgment, Sanctions Order, Rescue 1 Financial, LLC v. Doe, No. CACE-14-024286 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Broward Cty. Apr., 14, 2017), motion to vacate granted (Fla. Cir. Ct. Broward 
Cty. June 14, 2017). 
75 Volokh, Apparently-Fake-Defendant, supra note 71. 
76 This was so for all the cases in Appendix B except #3 (Lyman v. Bernard), #4 
(Serenbetz v. McDonald), and #19 (Horner v. Davis). Those three cases share boilerplate 
with the other cases, but don’t include the defendant’s address. 
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injunctions a mere four days after a complaint was filed together with a 
stipulation.77 
5. The plaintiffs, though they knew that something was being done by a rep-
utation management company on their behalf, may well have been unaware 
that a lawsuit was being filed in their names, much less that the lawsuit was 
against a fake defendant.78 
And the similar boilerplate and procedural history of the remaining 24 of the 26 
lawsuits—coupled with the lack of any record of the ostensible defendants at the 
ostensible defendants’ addresses, for the 23 cases where addresses were included—
suggests that something similar may have been going on in those cases as well. As 
with the forgeries, the 26 lawsuits sharing the boilerplate I describe here were aimed 
at vanishing a wide range of web pages, including: 
• Newspaper or magazine articles in the Charleston Post & Courier, the Da-
vis Enterprise, Investment News, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune, and the 
Penn State Collegian.79  
• A court opinion in a child pornography case stored on a case law repository 
site.80 
• Criticism of a Buddhist spiritual leader on a Buddhist discussion site (Dhar-
maWheel.net).81 
 
77 See Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Talson v. 
Martinez, No. 160603109 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. July 1, 2016); Order Granting Con-
sent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. July 1, 2016) (complaint filed June 27, 2016), vacated Oct. 20, 2016. 
78 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
79 See Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-
021440-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cty. Aug. 23, 2016) (Charleston Post & Courier); 
Plaintiff’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-
021440-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cty. Oct. 10, 2016); Complaint, Lyman v. Ber-
nard, No. LC104275 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. filed June 6, 2016) (Investment News); Com-
plaint, Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. Super. Ct. Shasta Cty. filed Mar. 3, 2016) (Davis 
Enterprise); Order, Nelson v. Spear, No. 160600824 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. June 14, 
2016) (Penn State Collegian); Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief, Wasserman 
v. Mack, No. 2016CA-002402-0000-00 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Polk Cty. filed July 15, 2016) (Sarasota 
Herald-Tribune). 
80 Complaint and Stipulated Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, 
Serenbetz v. McDonald, No. BC621992 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. June 9, 2016), motion 
denied (June 27, 2016), dismissed without prejudice (Oct. 11, 2016). 
81 Complaint and [Proposed] Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final 
Judgment, Norbu v. Campbell, No. 24-C-16-00250 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City filed Jan. 19, 
2016), dismissed (July 18, 2016); Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final 
Judgement, Norbu v. Campbell, No. 12-C-16-001959 (Md. Cir. Ct. Harford Cty. injunction 
issued July 18, 2016). 
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• Criticism of the Indonesian billionaire who appeared to be the intended 
beneficiary of one of the forged court orders discussed in Part I.82 
Many others were posts on complaint sites such as Ripoff Report. Most of the cases 
were filed pro se, likely because a lawyer would have a lot to lose from filing such 
a case.  
But seven other cases did involve lawsuits filed by lawyers83 (though perhaps 
lawyers who were just handed the documents and did not know the defendant was 
fake).84 These cases include the three Florida and Maryland ones that Ruddie had 
agreed to have vacated in Smith v. Garcia,85 and four others that share lawyers and 
legal boilerplate with those cases (or at least also involved Ruddie), and were also 
filed against purported defendants who don’t seem to have any connection to the 
listed address.86 
 
82 Order Granting Consent Motion and Final Judgment, Talson v. Martinez, No. 
160603109 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. injunction granted July 1, 2016); Notification to 
Parties of Contemplated Dismissal, Tanoto v. Brown, No. 24-C-16-000901 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Balt. City July 8, 2016), dismissed (Sept. 21, 2016); “Order Granting Consent Motion for 
Injunction and Final Judgement [sic],” Tanoto v. Brown, No. 12-C-16001958 (Md. Harford 
Cty. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2016). 
83 See Motion to Vacate Consent Judgment Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-535(b) and to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint with Prejudice, Smith & Rescue One Financial, LLC v. Levin, 
No. 24-C-15-004789 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Apr. 25, 2017); Consent Judgment, Cohen v. 
Wilkerson, No. 06-C-15-070022 (Md. Cir. Ct. Carroll Cty. Nov. 3, 2015); Complaint, Vi-
sionstar, Inc. v. Perez, No. 24-C-15-005743 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City filed Nov. 18, 2015), 
consent judgment ordered (Dec. 10, 2015); Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Final 
Default Judgment, Pursuant to Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.540, and to Dismiss this Case with Prejudice, 
Financial Rescue, LLC v. Smith, No. 15-006119-CI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Pinellas Cty. May 19, 
2017); Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate Final Default Judgment, Pursuant to Fla. 
R. Civ. P. 1.540, and to Dismiss this Case with Prejudice, Rescue 1 Financial LLC v. Doe, 
No. CACE-14-024286 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Broward Cty. June 14, 2017); Complaint and Applica-
tion for Injunctive Relief, Gottuso v. Marks, No. CV2015-009393 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa 
Cty. filed Sept 25, 2015); Complaint, Varden & Seasons Recovery Ctr. v. Lentz, No. 
CV2015-002098 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. filed Aug 11, 2015). 
84 See infra Section X.A.3 for more on the perils to lawyers of getting involved in such 
schemes, even unwittingly. 
85 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
86 Consent Judgment, Cohen v. Wilkerson, No. 06-C-15-070022 (Md. Cir. Ct. Carroll 
Cty. Nov. 3, 2015); Visionstar, Inc. v. Perez, No. 24C15005743 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City 
2015). Cohen and Visionstar were filed by the same lawyer that filed Smith v. Levin, one of 
the cases that Ruddie agreed to have vacated. Three other cases with similar language were 
filed by a different lawyer who had represented Profile Defenders: Stipulated Final Judg-
ment, SEO Profile Defender Network, LLC v. Koshik, No. 2015-CA-004544 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Palm Beach Cty. July 15, 2015); Stipulated Final Judgment, Technosystems Serv. Corp. v. 
Hess, No. 2015-CA-012599 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. Jan 19, 2016); Stipulated Final 
Judgment, World Patent Marketing Inc. v. Harris, No. 2016-CA-001846 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm 
Beach Cty. Mar. 24, 2016) (providing that plaintiffs may submit the court order to search 
engines, similar to language quoted infra note 153).  
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It’s a truism that lack of opportunity for an adversary presentation makes fact-
finding unreliable. These cases, and those below, show the truth of that truism. If 
Yelp or Google had been a party to the proceedings, it might well have noticed that 
the ostensible defendants were possibly fake. But in the cases described above, there 
was apparently no real adversary party that could notice this. 
 
IV.  STIPULATED INJUNCTIONS INVOLVING FAKE NOTARIZATIONS 
 
One means of verifying that a defendant actually exists is to get the defendant’s 
signature notarized. Consider Chinnock v. Ivanski, a case in which the plaintiff’s 
proposed Amended Order for Permanent Injunction contained the defendant’s sig-




Looks good at first—until one notices that the notary ID is 20121234567. That 
might appear suspicious, and in this instance, appearances do not deceive; there is 
no Samantha Pierce listed on the Colorado notary site, with that notary ID or any 
other.88 Indeed, the notary ID 20121234567 and the expiration date August 8, 2016, 
are the samples given on the Colorado Secretary of State Notarization Format Ex-
amples page.89 Likewise, on the earlier, pre-amendment Stipulated Order for Perma-
nent Injunction, the notary for Ivanski’s signature is said to be Amanda Sparks of 
Fulton County, Georgia.90 Again, there is no Amanda Sparks of Fulton County on 
the Georgia notary website.91 
 
87 Amended Order for Permanent Injunction, Chinnock v. Ivanski, No. CV2016-
094256 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Aug. 23, 2016).  
88 Verify a Notary, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.co.us/no-
tary/pages/public/verifyNotary.xhtml [https://perma.cc/HP5U-5KDH] (enter Pierce as last 
name and Samantha as first name) (last visited Jan. 14, 2020). 
89 Notarization Format Examples, COLO. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.co.us/ 
pubs/notary/formatExamples.html [https://perma.cc/VY6S-DXKG] (last visited Jan. 14, 
2020). To their credit, whoever copied the notary ID and expiration date when forging the 
Amanda Sparks stamp at least didn’t copy the sample notary’s name, which was John Q. 
Sample. 
90 Stipulation for Amended Order for Permanent Injunction, Chinnock v. Ivanski, No. 
CV2016-094256 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. 2016).  
91 Notary Index Search, GA. SUPER. CT. CLERKS’ COOP. AUTHORITY, 
https://search.gsccca.org/notary/search.asp [https://perma.cc/6WQW-Q77L] (enter Sparks, 
Amanda as name and select Fulton as county) (last visited Jan. 21, 2020). 
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Similarly, in Lynd v. Hood,92 the notary listed for the defendant’s signature is 
Jose Garcia from Harris County, Texas, and his license is said to expire on March 2, 
2016. But there is no Jose Garcia listed on the Texas notary website with the same 
license expiration date.93 (The injunction in Lynd also called for the deindexing of a 
professional media item, a San Antonio Express-News article describing the plain-
tiff’s split from his family business.94) Chinnock v. Ivanski and Lynd v. Hood were 
both filed by lawyers from one small Phoenix firm. That firm also litigated Welter 
v. Does, discussed in Section VI.B below; one of the lawyers in that firm was also 
the beneficiary of one of the Richart-Ruddie-linked orders discussed in Part III,95 
and some of the firm’s cases had been brought to it by Ruddie,96 though Chinnock 
apparently was not.97 
The Arizona State Bar investigated the lawyers involved in Chinnock, Lynd, 
and several other suspicious cases. Ultimately, the Bar and two of the lawyers stip-
ulated to a public admonition and two years’ probation.98 The judgment found that 
they were negligent in failing to properly investigate the facts in Chinnock (one law-
yer) and two other cases (the other lawyer), and failing to recognize that their client 
was trying to defraud the court. The judgment also suggests that the lawyers should 




92 No. CV2015-009398 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Feb. 2, 2016). 
93 Notary Search, TEX. SEC’Y OF STATE, http://direct.sos.state.tx.us/notaries/Nota-
rySearch.asp [https://perma.cc/9MEL-MWNU] (enter Jose for first name, Garcia for last 
name, and Harris for County) (last visited Jan. 14, 2020); see Complaint, In the Matter of 
Warner, Kelly & Raeesabbas, at 18 (Ariz. Pres. Discip. J. 2018). 
94 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Lynd v. Hood, No. CV2015-009398, at 
2 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Jan. 27, 2016); see also Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Libel 
Takedown Injunctions and Fake Notarizations, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2017, 6:03 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/30/libel-takedown-
injunctions-and-fake-notarizations/ [https://perma.cc/RD8P-U3LW].  
95 See Ruddie v. Kirschner, No. 24C15005620 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Dec. 14, 2015); 
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Welter v. Does, No. CV2016-004734 (Ariz. Su-
per. Ct. Maricopa Cty. June 29, 2016); see also Amended Order for Permanent Injunction, 
Chinnock v. Ivanski, No. CV2016-094256 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Aug. 23, 2016); 
Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Lynd v. Hood, No. CV2015-009398 (Ariz. Su-
per. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Feb. 2, 2016). 
96 See In re Kelly, No. PDJ 2018-9012, at 2–3 (Ariz. Presiding Discip. J. July 30, 2018) 
(describing the multiple client referrals that Ruddie made to Kelly).  
97 See In re Warner, No. PDJ 2018-9012 (Ariz. Pres. Discip. J. July 30, 2018) (discuss-
ing Chinnock but not mentioning referrals or Ruddie). 
98 See id. at 8. 
99 Id. 
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V.  INJUNCTIONS AGAINST A REAL DEFENDANT WHO IS NOT THE REAL AUTHOR 
 
Grisak Properties v. Baroro, a real case from Harris County (Houston, Texas), 
contains a real libel judgment and takedown injunction.100 The defendant stipulated 
to the judgment, and a real notary notarized the defendant’s signature on the waiver 
of service. There’s no reason to doubt that the notary did indeed notarize the signa-
ture; in a couple of related cases, I tracked down the notaries and got copies of their 
log book entries—which, under California law, they have to provide if given a writ-




To be sure, the petition says the defendant lives in Harris County, Texas, and 
the notarization is from Northern California. But people sometimes get documents 
notarized while traveling; I’ve done that a couple of times. 
But what are the odds that, in each of the seven defamation cases filed in 2016 
by one lawyer in Harris County, Texas, every defendant would be supposedly from 
Harris County—yet every signature would have been notarized in Northern Califor-
nia? And what are the odds that the same pattern would be visible in seven cases 
filed by other Texas lawyers, and in seven cases filed in Florida, Maryland, and 
Ohio, all of which share some similar boilerplate?102 We hear about eco-tourism, 
medical tourism, even sex tourism. But we never hear about notarization tourism. 
The Texas Attorney General’s office took an interest in the Texas cases, and 
ultimately got a $300,000 default judgment against Solvera Group (also known as 
InstantComplaintRemovers.com and DefamationRemoval.com), a reputation man-
agement company that had promised “guaranteed removals.”103 According to the 
AG’s office, Solvera duped the clients, who were often unaware that a lawsuit was 
even being filed in their names, or perhaps using similar-looking names. It duped 
the lawyers, who thought Solvera was sending them legitimately obtained and ap-
proved documents. It duped the courts, who thought they were being given legiti-
mate stipulations for a judgment. And they did that by getting the ostensible defend-
ants to lie about being responsible for the posts: 
 
100 Grisak v. Baroro, No. 2016-46539 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. July 27, 2016). 
101 CAL. GOV. CODE § 8206(c) (2017). 
102 See infra Appendix C for citations to all these orders. The one exception to the pat-
tern in the orders is that one of the defendants’ signatures was notarized in Southern Califor-
nia. 
103 Final Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, State v. Solvera Group, Inc., No. 
201756634 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. Oct. 11, 2018). 
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Solvera Defendants have a local California associate sign an affidavit, in 
which he/she falsely states that he/she is a resident of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion, including Harris County, and further falsely states that he/she en-
gaged in all of the conduct alleged in the lawsuit . . . .104 
 
Of course, if Solvera had the papers notarized in-state, or filed the lawsuits in a 
state that does not require such notarization, the scam would have been much harder 
to spot. I don’t know why they chose to file in Texas, rather than in California. Per-
haps they just got overconfident, thinking that nobody would be watching. Con-
sumer Opinion, which runs the PissedConsumer complaint site, sued Solvera Group 
and two California lawyers, claiming that 12 California cases likewise involved 
straw defendants who falsely admitted to writing posts that they had not actually 
written.105 But the proof in that case, which Consumer Opinion ultimately concluded 
it lacked the time and money to pursue, would have necessarily been more compli-
cated.  
In another case, one Cary Quattrocchi sued the consumer complaint site Com-
plaintsBoard.com over a user-posted page that criticized 1-800-Sky-Ride, Quattro-
chi’s hot air balloon business; he got a default judgment, which he then sent to 
Google, asking that the page be deindexed.106 But the address given in the lawsuit 
for ComplaintsBoard.com seemed to have nothing to do with that company, and 
instead matched the address of Erran Yearty, a business associate of Quattrocchi’s; 
and the court docket showed that “Service was delivered into the hands of Aaron 
Yearty (President/Owner) for Complaintsboard.com,” though Yearty appears not to 
be connected to ComplaintsBoard.107 (At the time, the Georgia Attorney General had 
sued Quattrochi and Yearty for unfair and deceptive business practices related to 
 
104 Plaintiff’s Original Petition at 7, Texas v. Solvera Group, Inc., No. 201756634 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. Aug. 24, 2017). 
105 See Complaint, Consumer Opinion LLC v. ZCS et al., No. CIVMSC17-01766 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Contra Costa Cty. Sept. 8, 2017); Tim Cushing, Bogus Lawsuit-Slinging Rep Man-
agement Firm Sued by Pissed Consumer, TECHDIRT (Sept. 20, 2017, 3:46 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170917/12432838226/bogus-lawsuit-slinging-rep-man-
agement-firm-sued-pissed-consumer.shtml [https://perma.cc/46G7-W324]; Tim Cushing, 
The Latest in Reputation Management: Bogus Defamation Suits from Bogus Companies 
Against Bogus Defendants, TECHDIRT (Mar. 31, 2016, 8:31 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20160322/10260033981/latest-reputation-management-bogus-defamation-suits-bo-
gus-companies-against-bogus-defendants.shtml [https://perma.cc/ZBC3-Z6MA]. 
106 See Quattrochi v. ComplaintsBoard.com, No. 17-J-01577 (Ga. Cobb Cty. Mag. Ct. 
Aug. 3, 2017). 
107 See Complaint, Quattrocchi v. ComplaintsBoard.com, No. 17-J-01577 (Ga. Cobb 
Cty. Mag. Ct. filed Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/14803193 
[https://perma.cc/6878-ULPP] (listing a home in Acworth, Georgia as the address for Com-
plaintsBoard.com; no address in Georgia is listed on the ComplaintsBoard.com website, and 
Google searches for Erran Yearty come up with that address).  
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how they promoted their business, Marvelay, LLC, and ultimately got a judgment 
against them.108) 
More broadly, cases such as this make me think we are seeing only the tip of 
the iceberg. Solvera got sloppy; Quattrochi was amateurish; but what about people 
who are more careful?  
For example, say that Paul Plaintiff arranges for a stipulated judgment in which 
Donna Defendant admits to supposedly libeling the plaintiff, at http:// 
ripoffreport.com/Paul-Plaintiff-Is-A-Cheater, but Donna actually has nothing to do 
with that post. If this is a one-off, without any telltale pattern of odd notarizations or 
similarly suspicious material, nothing in the file will offer a clue that the case is 
really a fraud; likewise, if this is part of a broader scam, but one in which the scam-
mer uses different boilerplate in different cases. Perhaps corresponding with Ripoff 
Report and asking them where the page came from geographically might be sugges-
tive, but even that would hardly be definitive.  
The cases I discuss in this Article thus form a lower bound for the amount of 
fraud that’s present in the libel deindexing system. But the actual amount is impos-
sible to know, and may well be a good deal higher. 
 
VI.  DEFAULT JUDGMENTS OBTAINED WITHOUT GENUINE ATTEMPTS  
AT LOCATING DEFENDANTS 
 
Default judgments in libel cases—whether against identified defendants or 
pseudonymous ones—can often be legitimate. Indeed, they can often be the best that 
an honest plaintiff can get. But they can also be obtained without any real attempt to 
serve or even identify the true defendant. In a traditional libel case, the plaintiff 
wants to find the defendant so that the defendant can be forced to pay damages. In a 
takedown or deindexing case, though, the plaintiff is seeking an order to send to a 
third party, and thus would rather that the real author stay far away and never have 
an opportunity to contest the case. 
It is impossible to tell just how often plaintiffs fail to take easy steps to find the 
alleged defamer. But one case well illustrates the peril. In 1999, Laurence Sharos 
pleaded guilty to “criminal sexual abuse” in Illinois.109 Based on court records, his 
crime was likely unwanted sexually motivated fondling.110 The website SexOf-
fenderRecord.com gathered this information from public records and published it.111 
 
108 Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Penalties, Restitution and Other Relief, Geor-
gia v. Marvelay, LLC, No. 17-1-5434-58 (Ga. Super. Ct. Cobb Cty. July 18, 2017); Consent 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Georgia v. Marvelay, LLC, No. 17-1-5434-58 (Ga. Su-
per. Ct. Cobb Cy. June 17, 2019). 
109 Eugene Volokh, Opinion, Default Judgment Aimed at Deindexing Apparently Accu-
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Years later, Sharos sued and got a default judgment concluding that the web-
site’s pages were “false and defamatory” because they labeled him a “sex of-
fender.”112 Sharos was indeed a sex offender, but Sharos argued that the “sex of-
fender” label—coupled with a reference on SexOffenderRecord.com pages to each 
listed person’s “registration status”—falsely conveyed that he is a registered sex 
offender, when in fact he had only been convicted of a sex offense and was not a 
registered sex offender.113 And the court agreed.114 
This conclusion might well have been wrong as a matter of law, and perhaps 
an adversary presentation (followed, if necessary, by an appeal) would have shown 
it to be wrong. But there was no adversarial proceeding, only a default judgment. 
Sharos’ lawyers claimed that SexOffenderRecord.com “provide[d] no means to con-
tact it,”115 and that they couldn’t find the site’s owners. According to one of Sharos’s 
lawyers (who as it happens had been co-counsel with the Ohio lawyer described in 
Part V, who filed several Ohio lawsuits with Northern California notarizations116), 
 
2. Prior to filing the Complaint in this matter, I conducted a search to 
determine the address for Defendant www.sexoffenderrecord.com, also 
known as www.sorarchive.com. I reviewed Defendant’s website but it 
does not contain any address or other identifying information such as a 
telephone number or contact information. Additionally, the “contact” page 
on the website is blank, has no form or any information to send any com-
munication to the site. Therefore, the website provides no means to contact 
it. 
3. I also conducted multiple searches on the Internet to try and deter-
mine the owner of the website and/or its location and also looked at various 
secretary of state websites. Through these efforts, I was unable to identify 
the address of Defendant or to locate any other identifying information 
about the Defendant.117 
 
Yet at SexOffenderRecord.com, the very top line of the site under the banner 
has a tag saying “Record Removal Inquiries.” That page has a form through which 
lawyers can submit record removal requests to the site.118  
 
112 Order for Default Judgment, Sharos v. www.sexoffenderrecord.com, No. CV-16-
870167 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty. Jan. 5, 2017).  
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment, Ex. 2, Aff. of 
Debrah J. Horn, Sharos v. www.sexoffenderrecord.com, No. CV-16-870167, at 1 (Ohio Ct. 
Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty. Jan. 5, 2017). 
116 Complaint, id., at 5. 
117 Horn Affidavit, supra note 115.  
118 SEX OFFENDER ARCHIVES, SexOffenderArchive.com [https://perma.cc/ZA4Y-
YZ3X] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (SexOffenderRecord.com reroutes to SexOffenderAr-
chive.com). 
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And “searches on the Internet” can actually easily identify the SexOffender-
Record.com operators within minutes. A Google Scholar search for “sexoffender-
record” finds Wilson v. Web.com Group, Inc.,119 which also involves SexOffender-
Record.com and Web Express and mentions Charles Rodrick, who appears to be one 
of the operators of the site. That search also finds Stewart v. Oesterblad,120 which 
involves the same site and mentions Charles Roderick (with a slightly different 
spelling than in Wilson) and Brent Oesterblad, who appears to be another of the 
operators. The information in the records of those cases could likely be used to track 
down the site operators further. 
A Google search for “sexoffenderrecord” also finds a USA Today article about 
a 2014 verdict against the operators of SexOffenderRecord.com and SORAr-
chives.com, which mentions Charles Rodrick.121 A Google News search finds the 
same site. And these are just free searches—Westlaw, Lexis, and Bloomberg Law 
searches may find still more cases. 
Thus, there was no real justification in this case for proceeding via service by 
publication and a default judgment, and the same may well be true of many other 
default judgments used to get takedown orders. We can’t know for sure, in most 
cases, precisely because there was no adversarial inquiry into the question. But we 
do know that the incentives (for the unscrupulous) point towards avoiding finding 
the correct defendant.122 
Sharos is the clearest example of what seems like an inadequate attempt to find 
a defendant; but more than 60 cases filed by one lawyer in Leon County, Florida 
(Tallahassee) likewise seem to involve attempts to find and serve the defendant that 
were doomed to failure.123 In the boilerplate “Affidavit[s] of Diligent Service” in all 
the cases, the lawyer asserts that he had tried various ways of identifying pseudony-
mous commenters: 
 
1. I have made diligent search and inquiry to discover the name, age 
and the current residence of Anonymous John Doe 1. Because this defa-
mation is published on the World Wide Web through various live URL 
links, a diligent search has been conducted by Brand.com on behalf of 
Brand.com, lnc., at my direction, and no live URL links were discovered 
which would identify the name, age and residence of Anonymous John 
Doe l. 
 
119 No. 2:15-cv-02198-GMN-CWH, 2016 WL 1600830 (D. Nev. Apr. 20, 2016).  
120 No. 4:13-cv-14841 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 5, 2014).  
121 Robert Anglen, Sex Offender Websites’ Victims Awarded $3.4M, USA TODAY (May 
16, 2014, 7:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/16/sex-offender-
websites-victims-awarded-34m-/9195315 [https://perma.cc/3A9B-SYSK].  
122 Some such sites have been accused of engaging in blackmail, by posting sex of-
fender records or ordinary criminal mugshots and then charging money to remove those rec-
ords; but no such accusation was made in this case. In any event, such an accusation would 
not justify a failure to serve SexOffenderRecord.com when its contact information was so 
easily available. 
123 See infra Appendix D for a list. 
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2. Brand.com is an on line brand management company (OBM) with 
over one hundred (100) employees who are skilled in researching the In-
ternet for live URL links which may provide information concerning 
Anonymous John Doe 1. After a diligent search by Brand.com, supervised 
by their Chief Legal Officer, no results were obtained which would iden-
tify the name, age and current address of Anonymous John Doe 1. The 
Brand.com search occurred prior to the execution of this Affidavit of the 
undersigned. 
3. The undersigned counsel has instructed staff in his office to search 
various social media sites including Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, 
LinkedIn and Google Plus to attempt to determine if any live URL links 
linked to such defamation would establish the name, age and current ad-
dress of Anonymous John Doe 1. No information was obtained by the 
search from the undersigned’s office. After such search, no information 
was derived which would establish the name, age and current address of 
Anonymous John Doe 1. 
4. Undersigned counsel has conferred with the Plaintiff who has ad-
vised the undersigned counsel that he is not aware of the name, age, or 
current address of Anonymous John Doe 1. 
5. The name, age and current address of Anonymous John Doe 1 is 
unknown to the undersigned counsel based upon the diligent inquiries set 
forth in Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above. 
6. Because of the anonymous authorship of the defamation, the only 
efforts which could have reasonably been made to determine the name, 
age and current address of Anonymous John Doe had been made by or on 
behalf of the Plaintiff. 
7. Based upon the statements in paragraphs set forth above, there 
could have been no legitimate attempt to serve process and the attempt to 
serve process would have been a waste of counsel’s time and the Plaintiffs 
money as any investigation would not have uncovered the identity of the 
Defendant Anonymous John Doe 1. 
8. The Defendant, through his, hers or its anonymous authorship of' 
such defamation has intentionally concealed his, hers or its identity and 
address or principal place of business so that process cannot be served.124 
 
But nothing in the files indicates any attempt to do what plaintiffs in Internet 
libel cases routinely do in trying to identify defendants—subpoenaing the records of 
the website where the alleged defamation was posted, to try to get the poster’s IP 
address and then track that address down to the poster’s Internet provider.125 To be 
sure, such attempts would be expensive, but at least they would be calculated to give 
 
124 See, e.g., Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Shavolian v. Doe, No. 2014-CA-
000845 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 1, 2014). 
125 See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 717 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
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the defendant notice of the lawsuit. The techniques set forth in the Affidavits seem 
nearly guaranteed to be inadequate.  
Brand.com, the “online brand management company” mentioned in the Affi-
davits of Diligent Search, was a prominent reputation management company at the 
time the cases were filed,126 though it went bankrupt shortly after.127 The owner of 
Brand.com was also the apparent beneficiary of one of the forged court orders de-
scribed in Part II.128 
 
VII.  WAG THE DOG INJUNCTIONS: SUING THE COMMENTER, NOT THE AUTHOR 
 
Say that people are trying to deindex not just a complaint site post, but a main-
stream media article. They might try forgery, as in the South Florida Business Jour-
nal incident described in the Introduction, but say they want a real court judgment 
that will show up if Google decides to check court records.  
They might try a stipulated judgment (as in Parts III through V) in which the 
media organization supposedly confesses that its post was libelous. A judge, though, 
would likely be suspicious about this. Mainstream media organizations rarely stipu-
late to such things, and if they do, they would probably have a fairly prominent law 
firm file something on their behalf. 
But say plaintiffs find a critical comment that has been posted under the article 
by an anonymous user. They then sue the commenter for libel and get a default or 
stipulated judgment that finds that the comment is defamatory (not that the article is 
defamatory).  
And then they submit the order directly to Google, asking Google to deindex 
the entire page at which the comment is posted. And that page includes the article 
itself: Because Google can only deindex entire pages, and can’t remove comments, 
the only way it can deindex the comment is by also deindexing the article to which 
it is attached. 
Consider, for instance, Young v. Anonymous John Doe. WFAA, a Dallas news 
station, wrote an article about Edwin Young, a fifty-five-year-old Texas minister, 
author, and founder of the Fellowship Church.129 The article alleged that Young was 
 
126 See John Koetsier, Brand.com Launches ‘First Systematic Program’ to Remove Lies 
and Libel from Google, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 13, 2013, 1:43 PM), http://venture-
beat.com/2013/11/13/brand-com-launches-first-systematic-program-to-remove-lies-and-li-
bel-from-google/ [https://perma.cc/HE8B-QYT2]. 
127 See Juliana Reyes, Brand.com Files for Bankruptcy, TECHNICAL.LY PHILLY (May 4, 
2015, 12:31 PM), http://technical.ly/philly/2015/05/04/brand-com-bankruptcy/ [https://perm 
a.cc/XPP6-PHT5]. 
128 See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing Apparently Forged Permanent 
Injunction, Gorman v. Steinborn et al., http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2338651 [https://perm 
a.cc/JA57-3HP5]). 
129 Prominent Grapevine Pastor Linked to Luxury, WFAA (Feb. 5, 2010, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.wfaa.com/news/local/investigates/prominent-grapevine-pastor-linked-to-lux-
ury/338287756 [https://perma.cc/5EL4-Y39B].  
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living a life of luxury and that attendance at church was declining.130 Four years 
later, “Noemi Perez Hernandez” posted an absurdly false comment on the page, 
claiming Young was homeless and abandoned his biological son sixty-five years 
ago.131 
Just three weeks after the comment was posted, Young’s lawyer filed a lawsuit 
in Florida state court against “Anonymous John Doe 1.”132 (This lawyer was also a 
lawyer in a case brought by Profile Defenders to deindex posts critical of their busi-
ness,133 though this was not one of the cases discussed in Part III.) The Affidavit of 
Diligent Search filed in Young didn’t state that the lawyer had tried to subpoena the 
commenter’s Internet Protocol address to track the commenter down,134 and WFAA 
told me that it hadn’t received any such subpoena.135 Instead, the lawyer used service 
by publication, publishing a notice in a local Florida newspaper announcing the 
suit—a practically ineffective form of notice, even if it is sometimes legally availa-






131 See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 8 and Exhibit A, Young v. Doe, No. 
2014-CA-013423 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. filed Nov. 5, 2014).  
132 Id. 
133 See generally SEO Profile Defender Network v. Koshik, No. 2015-CA-004544 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. 2015).  
134 Affidavit of Diligent Search at 2, Young v. Doe, No. 2014-CA-013423 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Palm Beach Cty. Nov. 12, 2015) (stating that “No attempts at service have been made be-
cause Defendant has concealed ther Online identify or possibly used a false name. As ex-
plained in the complaint, wfaa.com allows Defendant to post but does not verify their legal 
identity. Further, per the online posting, Defendant took steps to conceal their identity online 
by possibly using a false name and location. Thus, there is no foreseeable way to verify the 
legal identity of the author.”).  
135 Eugene Volokh, People Trying to Get Google to Deindex Professional News Site 
Articles, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2016, 7:27 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/vo- 
lokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/14/people-trying-to-get-google-to-deindex-professional-news- 
site-articles/ [https://perma.cc/9D4Y-TNN3] [hereinafter Volokh, People Trying to Get 
Google to Deindex].  
136 Order Granting Final Default Judgment, Young v. Doe, No. 2014-CA-013423, at 2, 
4, ¶¶ 3–4, 10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. June 17, 2015).  
137 Id. at 6–7. 
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A takedown request was sent to Google asking that this wfaa.com post be dein-
dexed.138 
It thus seems likely that this default judgment against a commenter was used to 
try to hide a possibly quite accurate article about Young, published by a Texas TV 
station. But the timing and the absurdly false nature of the comment also raises the 
possibility that someone on the plaintiff’s side—perhaps a reputation management 
company hired by Young—posted the comment precisely as an excuse to deindex 
the whole article. It is impossible to tell from these facts whether this actually hap-
pened in this case. It seems likely, however, and if this strategy wasn’t used in this 
case, it might have been used in others. 
Young is just one example. We see the same pattern in: 
 
• Shavolian v. Doe,139 aimed at deindexing a New York Daily News ar-
ticle about David Shavolian, a New York real estate businessman who 
was sued for workplace harassment.140 
• M & M Inc. v. Brooks,141 filed by the same lawyer as Young v. Doe 
and aimed partly at deindexing articles in the online technology pub-
lications Gizmodo, TechDissected, and DigitalTrends, criticizing an 
allegedly junk-science laundry technology sold by M & M Inc. 
• Bansal v. Kumar,142 aimed at deindexing a Phoenix New Times article 
that described the disbarment of a successful Arizona lawyer. 
• Shah v. Patel,143 aimed at deindexing a Columbus Dispatch article crit-
ical of a local doctor. 
 
A similar strategy seems to have been used in some of the fake-defendant cases 
discussed in Part III. Thus, for instance, in 2013, a Davis Enterprise newspaper ar-
ticle reported that a Shasta County parent placed false signatures on a petition asking 
a school not to change its gifted education program.144 Two and a half years later, a 
“Robert Castle” posted a comment underneath the article, accusing the parent of 
taking bribes.145 
 
138 Court Order Complaint to Google, LUMEN, http://www.lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/13178808 [https://perma.cc/LDA4-EFBN] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020) (providing final 
judgment in Young v. Doe and explaining that document was sent to Google). 
139 No. 2014-CA-000845 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. July 8, 2014). 
140 See Volokh, People Trying to Get Google to Deindex, supra note 135.  
141 Stipulated Final Judgement Including Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, M & M Inc. v. 
Brooks, No. 2016-CA-001330 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. Apr. 4, 2016).  
142 Judgment, Bansal v. Kumar, No. V425852, 2016 WL 11299722 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mont-
gomery Cty., Dec. 13, 2016).  
143 Judgment Entry, Shah v. Patel, No. 16CV10978 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Cty. 
Feb. 1, 2017).  
144 Volokh & Levy, supra note 62.  
145 Id. 
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Within a few months, a person apparently bearing the parent’s name purport-
edly sued “Robert Castle” in Shasta County and sought an injunction to compel Cas-
tle to remove the review.146 The plaintiff also supposedly filed a consent motion, 
with a signature purportedly from Castle.147  
Instead of simply granting the injunction, the court set a hearing on its own 
motion, noting that there was no proof of service of the complaint, consent motion, 
or proposed order.148 The docket doesn’t indicate that a hearing was ever held, which 
is consistent with the suspicion that “Castle” does not exist.149 A public records 
search revealed no “Robert Castle” in Shasta County, even though court filings in-
cluded a Shasta County address.150 
Yet about two months later, a similar complaint with the same supposed plain-
tiff and defendant was filed in Los Angeles County.151 This time, the stipulated in-
junction was granted without a hearing.152 Similar comment-based lawsuits were 
brought in attempts to deindex articles in the Charleston Post & Courier and the 
Penn State Daily Collegian.153 
Note that, for some reason, it appears that the Los Angeles County injunction 
was never actually submitted to Google with a request to deindex the Davis Enter-
 
146 Order Setting Hearing Date on Consent Motion, Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Shasta Cty. Mar. 8, 2016).  
147 Id.  
148 Id. 
149 See Volokh & Levy, supra note 62; see also Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Shasta Cty. filed Mar. 3, 2016).  
150 See Volokh & Levy, supra note 62. 
151 Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief, Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. filed May 23, 2016). 
152 Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Glatter v. Castle, 
No. SC125890 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. June 24, 2016).  
153 See Complaint and Application for Injunctive Relief, Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-
021440-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cty. filed Aug. 17, 2016); Complaint and Appli-
cation for Injunctive Relief, Nelson v. Spear, No. 160600824 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. 
June 10, 2016). Note that the ostensible plaintiff might not have authorized or expected an-
ything untoward. See Volokh & Levy, supra note 62. A person who hires a seemingly trust-
worthy “reputation management company” might assume that its work won’t involve fraud-
ulent court filings; and Profile Defenders had been mentioned by reputable publications. See, 
e.g., Johnny Diaz, Refreshing Your Digital Identity /Reputation Managers Scrub Dirt From 
Companies’ Online Profiles, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2012, at C4; Angus Loten, Hoping to Fix 
Bad Reviews? Not So Fast—Services Promise to Erase a Business’s Negative Feedback on 
Sites Like Yelp and Angie’s List, but Tactics Are Questioned, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2012, at 
B5. Indeed, some purported plaintiffs in such cases have said that they did not authorize the 
filing of the lawsuits. 
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prise article, even though the injunction specifically contemplated such a submis-
sion.154 And even if it had been submitted, Google may well have noticed that there 
was something fishy about an attempt to deindex an article in a credible news source. 
 
VIII.  BURIED-URL INJUNCTIONS 
 
When there is a default or stipulated judgment, many judges often ask the law-
yers to submit a suitable order,155 and essentially trust the lawyers to do so properly. 
Sometimes, the judge might review the proposed order with some skepticism; and 
indeed, the ostensible rule in default judgment cases is that the judge should make 
sure that the facts alleged by the plaintiff actually warrant liability and the requested 
remedy.156 But in practice, most judges apparently don’t deeply delve into what the 
lawyers submit. 
In particular, it’s pretty unlikely that a judge would look closely at all the URLs 
in a long list of URLs that are to be deindexed. A lawyer could thus bury a URL 
there, even though it’s clear that the URL does not come from the ostensible defend-
ant—for instance, the URL is of a government document or an article published by 
a media outlet. 
 
A.  Government Documents 
 
Consider, for instance, Fertel v. Saul. A Maryland lawyer represented Mary-
land author Morton Fertel, the author of DVDs that offered marriage counseling. Jan 
Davidson, apparently a disappointed customer who lived in California, had posted 
criticisms of Fertel’s company, accusing Fertel of refusing to honor money-back 
guarantees and the like.157 The lawyer sued Davidson in Maryland federal district 
 
154 “If the Defendant cannot remove the Defamation from the Internet, the Plaintiff shall 
submit this Order to Google, Yahoo, Bing, or any other Internet search engine so that the 
link can be removed from their search results pursuant to their existing policies concerning 
de-indexing of defamatory material.” Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction & Final 
Judgment at 2, Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. June 24, 2016).  
155 See, e.g., CHAMBERS PRACTICES OF THE HON. RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II. UNITED 
STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 1, https://www.nvd.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Cha 
mbers-Practices-of-RFB.pdf [https://perma.cc/53KU-EC72] (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) 
(“Parties are requested to submit a Proposed Order for all stipulations and unopposed mo-
tions including a Motion for Default Judgment.”). 
156 See, e.g., Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 4th 267, 271–73 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011); Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez, 223 Cal. App. 4th 377, 392–93 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2014); SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 814 (2d Cir. 1975). 
157 Daryl of Granbury, TX, Ripoff Report #769548, Complaint Review: Mort Fertel—
Baltimore Maryland, RIPOFF REPORT (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.ripoffreport.com/re-
ports/software-mort-fertel-mort-fertel-marriage-max-marr-769548 [https://perma.cc/E7Z7-
F7XE] (last visited Feb. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Ripoff Report #769548].  
272 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
court, seeking to get an order that could be used to deindex three posts, but the court 
dismissed the claim because it lacked personal jurisdiction over Davidson.158 
The lawyer then sued one Seemah Saul in Maryland state court, for allegedly 
posting comments that defamed Fertel.159 The lawsuit sought to use the comments 
as a basis for deindexing over twenty posts to which the comments were attached, 
including all three that were the targets of the unsuccessful Fertel v. Davidson 
case.160 Saul’s comments, though, were much less negative than the posts. The com-
ments generally said things such as, “Mort Fertel plagiarized Dr. Harley’s book. 
Mort has the best program out there . . . it works, but it’s plagiarized.”161 Consumers 
of marriage counseling advice would likely be much more put off by claims that a 
product doesn’t work, or can’t be returned if it doesn’t work, than by claims about 
plagiarism mixed with substantive praise. 
Saul didn’t actively contest the case, but the lawyer’s memorandum in support 
of the judgment stated that the lawyer had “determined” that defendant Saul was, in 
fact, the person responsible for various defamatory statements.162 On the strength of 
these allegations, the court issued a default judgment against the defendant, which 
necessarily assumes that the defendant is actually responsible for the statements in 
question and that the statements in question are, in fact, defamatory.163 
Yet here are some of the sites that the injunction included, as supposedly being 




158 Fertel v. Davidson, Civ. No. CCB-13-2922, 2013 WL 6842890, at *2, *6 (D. Md. 
Dec. 18, 2013).  
159 Complaint, Fertel v. Saul, No. 24C14003049 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21, 2014).  
160 Id. 
161 Ripoff Report #769548, supra note 157, cmt. (by Seemah S. on July 25, 2013) (cap-
italization added for clarity). 
162 Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, 
Fertel v. Saul, No. 24C14003049 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City Apr. 15, 2015).  
163 Order of Final Judgment, Fertel v. Saul, No. 24C14003049, at 2 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. 
City April 16, 2015).  
164 Id. at 1, 3. 
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Item 19 on the list of 29 supposedly defamatory web pages was the district court 
order in Fertel v. Davidson, the earlier case that the plaintiff and plaintiff’s lawyer 
had lost. The plaintiff’s lawyer then sent an order to Google requesting that it dein-
dex the URLs listed in the order.165  
The earlier court order, of course, wasn’t written by defendant Saul. Even if it 
contained factual errors, it couldn’t have been libelous—as a court opinion, it’s priv-
ileged. Yet the plaintiff’s lawyer was trying to get this official government document 
hidden from the public on the strength of a default judgment against Saul. 
Likewise, in Taplin v. Williams, a default judgment called for deindexing a Cal-
ifornia Department of Real Estate page imposing discipline on plaintiff Steve Taplin 
(a real estate agent), as well as deindexing a judicial opinion from the Georgia Court 
of Appeals.166 The two were buried in a list of 14 URLs, as items 12 and 13; here is 
the tail end of that list:167 
 
 
Similarly, in Karosa v. Killian, the default judgment calls for deindexing an admin-
istrative order that mentioned a case brought against plaintiff; a judicial opinion in 
a case brought by plaintiff; and an order imposing a fine on plaintiff in a disciplinary 




. . . 
 
 
165 Letter from David E. Fink, P.A., to Google Inc. (Apr. 28, 2015) (on file with author).  
166 Order Granting Default Judgment at 2, Taplin v. Williams, No. CV2015-053547 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2016) (“Plaintiff may request removal or deindexing of all content 
from Google and other search engines.”). 
167 Id. at 3. 
168 Order Granting Default Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff, Karosa v. Killian, No. A-12-
670259-C at 9–10 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Nov. 1, 2016). 




And there are other such cases: Ramsthel v. Penny sought to deindex, among 
other things, a public notice published in a local legal newspaper announcing the 
lawsuit itself.169 Likewise, in Intravas, Inc. v. Metcalf, the same law firm as in Ram-
sthel sought to deindex—on the grounds that they were supposedly defamatory—
posted copies of documents in the same case, including a subpoena that it had itself 
submitted.170 
Google generally appears reluctant to deindex government documents and pro-
fessional media articles, which can frustrate such a plaintiff stratagem. But the tactic 
has sometimes worked, for instance, in the Taplin case, until Google was alerted to 
it. 
 
B.  Media Articles 
 
Likewise, consider Flynn v. Garcia, where a stipulated judgment contains hun-
dreds of URLs from complaint sites that let anonymous users post criticism about 
others.171 Among those sites (in the middle of the third page of URLs) is a single 
URL from Nevada’s largest circulating newspaper—Las Vegas Review-Journal:172 
 
 
169 Default Judgment, Ramsthel v. Penny, No. CV2014-093104 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Mar-
icopa Cty. Sept. 24, 2014).  
170 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Intravas, Inc. v. Metcalf, No. CV2012-
013872 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Oct. 9, 2013).  
171 Stipulation and Order, Flynn v. Garcia, No. A-13-676559-C (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark 
Cty. Feb. 21, 2013).  
172 The underlining is in the original court document, presumably because the court 
copied some of the links as HTML links, which many word processors underline. 




It is impossible, of course, to tell whether the Las Vegas Review-Journal URL 
was deliberately buried in the proposed order, so that the judge would not notice it, 
or whether it was just included alongside all the other URLs because someone came 
up with it in a search, and the lawyer never investigated each URL to make sure the 
defendant posted it. Nevertheless, it seems likely that a busy judge, faced with a list 
of over a hundred URLs in a proposed default judgment, didn’t examine the list 
closely—and didn’t seriously consider whether the evidence presented showed that 
all the URLs contained defamatory material.173 
Again, these two items were just a sample; we see the same pattern in: 
• Ramsthel v. Penny,174 another case from the firm connected to the forged 
notarization cases (Part IV) and in Welter v. Does (Section VI.B), in which 
the final order lists 228 URLs, including items on The Atlantic’s site The 
Wire (item 25) and on Yahoo News (item 38). 
 
173 Cf. Kim v. Westmoore Partners, 201 Cal. App. 4th 267, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) 
(noting, “not [for] the first time,” that trial courts not infrequently rubber-stamp proposed 
remedies in motions for default judgment). 
174 No. CV2014-093104 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. default judgment Sept. 24, 
2014).  
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• Generational Equity, LLC v. Does,175 where the plaintiff’s complaint and 
the eventual injunction include—buried deep within hundreds of other 
URLs—three articles in Inc., a prominent business magazine.176  
• Salle v. Marine Logistics, which contains 35 URLs including (as #26) one 
for a 1997 Orlando Sentinel article.177  
• Kriss v. Reviewer, which includes the URL of a Miami Daily Business Re-
view article (as #31 out of 43 URLs).178 
• United Realty Advisors v. Verschleiser, which includes the URL of New 
York Post, Law360, and The Real Deal articles critical of a prominent real 
estate investor (as #66, #72–73, and #77–78 out of 191 URLs).179 
 
IX.  LYING THEN OR LYING NOW? 
 
In several cases, plaintiffs who dislike professional media articles that criticize 
them have: 
a. apparently obtained stipulations from sources quoted in the stories, recant-
ing their allegations, 
b. obtained court orders against the sources based on those stipulations, and 
then 
c. submitted the orders to Google, asking Google to deindex the critical arti-
cle. 
Now, if these sources were to recant directly to the media organizations, the 
editors would reasonably ask: Were the sources lying then, or are they lying now?180 
If the editors are persuaded that the recantation is accurate, they might well publish 
a correction, or revise or even take down the original article. But if they think the 
original report was accurate, and the recantation was false—perhaps coerced using 
the threat of a lawsuit—they might stand by their story. 
 
175 See Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition, Generational Equity, LLC v. Does #1–100, 
No. 401-00232-2014 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Collin Cty. Mar. 21, 2014); Second Judgment Modify-
ing Order Granting Generational Equity’s Permanent Injunction, No. 401-00232-2014 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Collin Cty. April 2, 2014) (requiring material to be removed from certain URLs and 
“related pages”). 
176 Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition at 11–12, Generational Equity, LLC v. Does #1–
100, No. 401-00232-2014 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Collin Cty. Mar. 21, 2014). 
177 Agreed Final Judgment & Permanent Injunction, Salle v. Marine Logistics Group, 
LLC, No. 50 2015 CA 004469 XXXX MB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Cty. June 19, 2015).  
178 Order Granting Judgment & Entry of Permanent Injunction, Kriss v. Reviewer, No. 
A1502350 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. Sept. 10, 2015).  
179 Order & Permanent Injunction, United Realty Advisors, LP v. Verschleiser, No. 14-
cv-05903(JGK)(MHD) (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015). 
180 This question is sometimes credited to Agatha Christie’s Witness for the Prosecution 
(and to the Charles Laughton and Marlene Dietrich film based on Christie’s play), see, e.g., 
Franklin R. Garfield, Deposing Witnesses: Who’s Lying Now?, 41 L.A. L. 48, 48 (2018), but 
it was already old by then. See, e.g., Archbishop Kenrick, 22 CHRISTIAN WORLD 225, 225 
(1871) (“Substantially the question which they put to him is this: Were you lying then, or are 
you lying now?”). 
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Yet when a plaintiff sues the source, gets a stipulation, and submits the order to 
Google with a deindexing request, the plaintiff is trying to short-circuit the news 
organization’s review of the matter. The plaintiff aims to get the original story hid-
den, with no independent evaluation of whether the story was and continues to be 
correct. 
Consider, for example, Ball v. Saurman. A Ventura County Star article had 
quoted Sandee Saurman as sharply criticizing Dr. Kiely Ball’s hearing aid com-
pany.181 Ball sued Saurman, who eventually agreed to a stipulation in which she 
stated that her original allegations were false.182 A court then issued an injunction, 
which was submitted to Google for deindexing of the newspaper article.183 
Likewise, consider Welter v. Does, an Arizona case filed by the law firm that 
filed the cases containing apparently forged notarizations discussed in Part IV. Me-
gan Welter made the national news as an Iraq War veteran who became an Arizona 
Cardinals cheerleader,184 but then made the news again when she was arrested for 
allegedly beating her boyfriend, Ryan McMahon.185 Two years later, Welter filed a 
defamation lawsuit against McMahon, and McMahon submitted a stipulation saying 
that his original allegations were false.186 
Welter then got an injunction stating that McMahon’s allegedly defamatory 
statements were posted on ABC News, Fox Sports, CBS News, and USA Today, 
presumably because articles on those sites were based on those statements.187 The 
injunction ordered the defendant to take all actions, “including requesting removal 
of the URLs from all Internet search engines, . . . to remove all such webpages and 
cache from the Internet, such that the Content is rendered unsearchable.”188 Again, 
because this was a stipulated judgment, there was no factual determination of 
whether McMahon’s statements were actually defamatory. Indeed, at the hearing, 
McMahon made clear that he stood by his initial story on the facts, but was support-
ing Welter out of sympathy: 
 
Even though she did these things, I really believe that everybody deserves 
a fresh start. And if it ever happened to me, I would want someone to do 
 
181 Judgment, Ball v. Saurman, No. 56-2012-00418245-CU-DF-VTA (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Ventura Cty. Dec. 28, 2016).  
182 Id. 
183 Id.  
184 See, e.g., Cardinals Cheerleader Also Iraq Vet, FOX SPORTS (July 31, 2013, 1:00 
AM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/arizona-cardinals-cheerleader-megan-welter-also 
-an-iraq-war-vet-073113 [https://perma.cc/5YM4-58L2].  
185 See, e.g., Aditi Roy & Alexis Shaw, Arizona Cardinals Cheerleader Megan Welter 
Caught on Video Allegedly Attacking Boyfriend, ABC NEWS (Aug. 3, 2013, 9:49 AM), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/iraq-war-vet-turned-nfl-cheerleader-arrested-allegedly/story?id= 
19861885 [https://perma.cc/W2NA-M29K].  
186 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Welter v. Does, No. CV2016-004734 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. June 29, 2016).  
187 Id. 
188 Id. 
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this for myself. So I am okay with that. I guess that I hope she learns her 
lesson, and she takes care of it and doesn’t do it again.189 
 
Yet plaintiff asked Google to deindex all those mainstream media articles, on the 
strength of McMahon’s formal stipulation.190 (Google did not go along.) 
For another example of the same technique, see Desert Palm Surgical Group 




189 Hear Audio Recording of Status Conference, Welter v. Does, No. CV2016-004734 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. June 29, 2016).  
190 Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction, Welter v. Does, No. CV2016-004734 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. June 29, 2016), http://www.lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/12644181 [https://perma.cc/4XEN-ESUV]. 
191 Order for Injunction, at 1, Desert Palm Surgical Group, PLC v. Petta, No. CV2008-
010464 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. June 13, 2016); see also Judgment, Bansal v. Kumar, 
No. V425852 (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cty. Dec. 13, 2016) (aimed at deindexing Phoenix 
New Times article titled, “Wealthy Tempe Lawyer Rips Off Clients, Loses License”); Ray 
Stern, Wealthy Tempe Lawyer Rips Off Clients, Loses License, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Dec. 
14, 2015, 2:38 PM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/wealthy-tempe-lawyer-rips-
off-clients-loses-license-7896537 [https://perma.cc/VAB2-M5VV]. 




X.  IMPLICATIONS: DESIGNING SYSTEMS IN A FALLEN WORLD 
 
I hope that I’ve told you an enjoyable story—a more lurid one than usual, by 
the admittedly tame standards of law reviews. But can we do more with this than 
just marvel at the enduring human capacity for cheating? 
It seems that this is a good case study (though just one of many possible case 
studies) for thinking about designing legal systems to deal with the risk of fraud. 
Trust may be a sound default in many aspects of life, especially in dealing with 
repeat players. Elaborate checking is often so expensive and taxing on a relationship 
that it’s better to run the risk of occasional fraud. If you go to your neighborhood 
supermarket and complain that some food you bought was spoiled, they probably 
won’t have elaborate verification procedures; instead, they’ll tell you to get a re-
placement for free, even if that means that some people can game the system that 
way. Indeed, trust is often important to help build relationships, in situations—such 
as among coworkers—where people work with each other repeatedly.192  
But in some areas, especially where valuable things—such as reputations—are 
at stake, and where the parties generally don’t have enduring business relationships 
with each other, systems that trust excessively actually breed more fraud, as potential 
defrauders realize how easily the systems can be deceived. Google had the best of 
intentions, I think, in agreeing to deindex material based on a court order addressed 
to a third party. In a world full of honest people, that would be an unalloyed good. 
Yet, of course, in a world full of honest people, there would be a lot less need for 
libel law. And in a world full of real people, some of whom are more honest and 
some less so, Google’s policy has likely prompted people to cheat in order to try to 
exploit it. 
People often remark that internet fraud is common because the internet was not 
designed with security in mind. Its architects understandably focused on how useful 
it would be for people to easily communicate with each other—but they didn’t worry 
 
192 See Nan S. Russell, The Problem with a Trust-But-Verify Approach, PSYCH. TODAY 
(July 25, 2015), http://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/trust-the-new-workplace-cur-
rency/201507/the-problem-trust-verify-approach [https://perma.cc/R3VR-84Q5] (“Trust, 
but verify when outcome trumps relationship. But if it doesn’t, go first with trust and build 
trusted relationships.”). 
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enough about people being able to maliciously misuse these communication mech-
anisms (for instance, by launching “denial-of-service” attacks that use a deluge of 
communications to block access to a site) and thus didn’t build in protections against 
such misuse.193 As they say, “The ‘S’ in internet stands for security.”194 
What we see here is that the Internet takedown request system likewise wasn’t 
designed with security in mind, or at least with security against these sorts of she-
nanigans. If everyone is honest, then the takedown system works fairly well. But 
cheaters have many ways of gaming it, some of which are hard for recipients of 
orders to spot. With that in mind, let me offer a few observations, though I hope that 
readers will draw many others that haven’t occurred to me. 
 
A.  Preventing Fraud Through Verification 
 
1.  Consumers of Orders 
 
(a)  Vigilance Generally 
 
To begin with, anyone who gets a court order should at least check that it is 
authentic. Fortunately, many court systems place their documents online, sometimes 
available for free and sometimes at a modest expense that shouldn’t be hard for a 
search engine company or a hosting company to bear.195 
At least, the recipient should confirm that the case exists (most of the forgeries 
I have uncovered can be caught based on that alone) and that the order is listed on 
the docket. But to be careful, the recipient should also get a copy of the order from 
the court and compare it to the submitted order. Some sophisticated forgers have 
taken real documents from real cases but then substituted new URLs to be deindexed 
(which had never been submitted to the court) instead of the authentic ones.196 
 
193 See, e.g., Dave Lee, Huge Hack “Ugly Sign of Future” for Internet Threats, BBC 
(Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26136774 [https://perma.cc/3MDP-
FX2U]. 
194 Well, they say it especially about “IoT,” the Internet of Things (as a Google search 
for “The S in IoT stands for Security” will reveal). See, e.g., Chris Romeo, The S in IoT 
Stands for Security, IOT, INC., https://www.iot-inc.com/the-s-in-iot-stands-for-security-arti-
cle/ [https://perma.cc/3BJ2-CZ5F]. But it’s also true of the Internet more broadly. 
195 Federal court documents, for instance, cost 10 cents per page on PACER; perhaps 
they ought to be available for free for various reasons, but this cost isn’t a serious barrier for 
businesses that are trying to verify whether an order they received is authentic, especially 
given that employee time will likely be a much larger expense. Even the L.A. Superior Court 
fee, $1 per page for the first five pages in a document and $0.40 per page for further pages, 
isn’t that high for such purposes. See Electronic Public Access Fee Schedule, PACER, 
https://www.pacer.gov/documents/epa_feesched.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KPQ-UAVZ]. 
196 See, e.g., Apparently Forged Permanent Injunction, Gorman v. Steinborn, http://lu-
mendatabase.org/?sid=2338651 [https://perma.cc/6V5V-YGWP] (copying everything ex-
cept for the URL from Permanent Injunction, Gorman v. Steinborn, No. 2:14-cv-00890-
GAM (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2015)).  
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With some courts, this requires more work. Some courts require you to call the 
court clerk’s office, pay by credit card, and then wait for the copies to arrive in the 
mail. Some require you to send a letter and a check. A few don’t accept checks drawn 
on out-of-state banks, which generally means you have to pay by money order 
(something one might have expected in the 1970s, not in the 2020s). A few don’t 
send records at all, so you can only get the records through a document retrieval 
service, which can cost $50 to $100. Indeed, I’m surprised at how many of the forged 
court orders purported to be from courts that have good online document retrieval 
services. If you’re going to forge an order, why not pretend that it comes from a 
court whose records are hard to track down, hoping that anyone doing the checking 
will just give up? 
Google, as best I can tell, has generally tried to check the authenticity of the 
orders that it has received, and has only rarely been duped into deindexing based on 
forgeries. Likewise, it has tried to spot other obvious frauds. Other consumers of 
orders should do the same. 
 
(b)  Notice to Affected Parties 
 
Unfortunately, many frauds aren’t obvious from the face of an order. Say, for 
instance, that a defendant stipulates to a takedown order, but the defendant didn’t 
actually write the allegedly libelous post (see Part V). Nothing in the order would 
signal that the defendant was lying, at least unless the order is part of a suspicious 
pattern (as with the Texas orders where all the defendants’ signatures were notarized 
in California). 
Our legal system usually deals with this risk through the adversary process. If 
a fake order is aimed at, say, getting a site to take down a post, and the order is sent 
to the site operator, then the operator can look closely at it. The operator might 
check, for instance, whether the defendant’s location matches the location connected 
to the Internet Protocol address from which the post was posted. Or if the operator 
has the author’s e-mail address, the operator can e-mail the author and see the au-
thor’s response. 
That can help prevent mistaken takedowns, and it can also help expose the 
fraudulent schemes. Indeed, that’s how the fake defendant scam discussed in Part III 
was uncovered (and how I began to research this field more broadly):  
a. Yelp got an order that appeared to be a stipulated judgment in a libel case. 
b. Yelp informed the target of the order, Matthew Chan. 
c. Chan let Yelp know that he hadn’t been sued, and gave them evidence that 
supported his position (for instance, that the lawsuit was against a “Mathew 
Chan” in Baltimore, and the real Chan was a Georgia resident who posted 
a comment about a Georgia dentist). 
d. Based on this, Yelp decided not to take down Chan’s review. 
e. Chan then let me know, which led Paul Alan Levy and me to investigate 
the matter further and find two dozen other cases that were part of the same 
scam. 
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Had Yelp just acted on the order, deleting the comment without letting Chan 
know about it, Chan would doubtless have never noticed. But when Google is asked 
to deindex a page, it generally doesn’t notify the owner of that page, or even of that 
site. Web pages might not have an e-mail address attached to them, but even when 
an e-mail address for the site operator is easy to find, Google generally doesn’t in-
form the operator of any deindexing plans.197 This, I think, is a missed opportunity 
for helping avoid takedown frauds. 
 
2.  Courts 
 
(a)  Verifying Authenticity of Orders 
 
Courts should also make it as easy as possible to verify whether court orders 
are authentic. Even if they don’t have their records online, they should at least have 
an e-mail address to which someone can submit a purported order to verify that it is 
real. 
Indeed, after CBS News started investigating the forgeries discussed in Part 
II198—of which 12 purported to be from Hamilton County, Ohio—the Hamilton 
County Clerk announced “a customer service telephone hotline and email system 
for anyone who questions the authenticity of a judicial order: 513-946-5686 or rec-
ordsverify@cms.hamilton-co.org.”199 This likely involves only modest expense, 
since any particular court system is likely to get only a few such queries. But I think 
it’s necessary to preserve the court system’s own credibility and effectiveness. After 
all, judges want people to promptly follow their orders; providing such verification 
helps with that. As the Hamilton County Clerk put it, 
 
It is critical that our citizens have faith in the accuracy of judicial orders 
and court documents . . . . That they know when a judge sentences some-




197 See, e.g., E-mail from Michael Podolsky, CEO of PissedConsumer.com, to Eugene 
Volokh, author (Aug. 5, 2019) (on file with the author) (noting Google does not notify 
PissedConsumer when its content is deindexed from Google). 
198 See Axelrod & Bast, supra note 55. 
199 Kevin Grasha & Max Londberg, Aftab Announces New Protocols in Wake of Report 
About Fake Court Orders, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (July 25, 2019, 9:09 PM), 
https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2019/07/25/forged-hamilton-county-judicial-orders 
-prompts-investigation/1831680001/ [https://perma.cc/4MW8-HVXB]. 
200 Raven Richard, Forged Court Orders Trigger New Security Measures in Hamilton 
County, WCPO (July 26, 2019, 2:49 PM), http://www.wcpo.com/news/local-news/hamilton-
county/forged-court-orders-trigger-new-security-measures-in-hamilton-county [https://per 
ma.cc/4GSG-U25C]. 
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And of course, such a system can be used to catch other kinds of forged orders be-
sides just forged libel takedown orders.201 
 
(b)  Verifying Authenticity of Sealed Orders 
 
Such verification systems are especially important in the rare situations where 
court records (including orders) are sealed: juvenile court cases are one example, 
and in many states expungement orders are another.202  
Because of the risk of forgery—and people’s need to be able to confirm that a 
document is not forged—overly aggressive sealing systems may be counterproduc-
tive even for the very people who ostensibly benefit from the sealing. Say, for in-
stance, that you get a conviction or an arrest expunged. You send the expungement 
order to a newspaper that covered the case in its police blotter and ask that the news-
paper remove your name from the archived article on the Web. Some newspapers 
might be willing to do that.203 
If the editors are aware of the risk of forgery, they will want to be able to con-
firm that the order is authentic. Simply seeing the document, however official it 
might look, wouldn’t suffice; they would need to look up the order on the court’s 
record system, or call the clerk of the court to check the order’s validity. But if the 
state views the expungement as completely sealing the case—or, in some states, as 
mandating that the case file be deleted outright—then there is no way to prove that 
the order is indeed authentic. 
 
201 See, e.g., United States v. Grados, 758 F. App’x 247, 248 (3d Cir. 2018) (affirming 
conviction of ex-husband who forged court order to block distribution of property settlement 
payments to his ex-wife); United States v. Cowan, 116 F.3d 1360, 1361 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(finding that a lawyer had forged a court order so that his client would think that his case had 
been dismissed on the merits, rather than because of the lawyer’s failure to act on the case); 
United States v. Barber, 39 F.3d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding that a lawyer forged a 
court order dismissing his client’s case after failing to inform client the case had been dis-
missed three years earlier); United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1094 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(finding that an inmate forged court order to get unrestricted access to prison law library); 
Superseding Indictment, United States v. Greene, No. 2:07-cr-00120-JS (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 
2007) (finding that an identity thief forged judge’s signature on subpoena); Petition on Su-
pervised Release, United States v. Greene, No. 2:07-cr-00120-JS (confirming that the iden-
tity thief was indeed sentenced for that crime). 
202 Compare Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182, 196 (Mass. 2014) (holding that 
routine expungement of criminal records was consistent with the First Amendment); State v. 
D.H.W., 686 So. 2d 1331, 1336 (Fla. 1996) (likewise), with Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 511 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that such expungement is constitutional 
only in extraordinary cases). 
203 See, e.g., ONLINE NEWS ASS’N, Removing Material from Your Archives, http://eth-
ics.journalists.org/topics/removing-material-from-your-archives/ [https://perma.cc/8C9F-
8RK4] (“If proper and complete documentation is produced that shows an arrest was ex-
punged from a person’s record, you should consider whether that is grounds to remove the 
charge from your website.”). 
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Thus, if a state does authorize the sealing of some orders, whether expungement 
orders, orders in juvenile criminal cases, or even some libel or invasion of privacy 
judgments, it needs to provide a verification mechanism. Even if the editors can’t 
ask the court for a copy of an order, they should at least be able to send the court a 
purported copy and ask whether it is authentic.204 That way, a web site operator that 
wants to act on such orders can do so, while still being confident that the orders are 
authentic. 
 
3.  Lawyers 
 
Lawyers should also think about the risk of client fraud when organizing their 
own practices. Of course, lawyers are supposed to be skeptical and careful people, 
who are always aware of the danger that people—including their clients—will lie 
(or, even more often, simply err). And though lawyers may construct an argument 
that they suspect, or even know, is inconsistent with the facts (e.g., casting doubt on 
a witness’s honesty or accuracy even if they know the witness is telling the truth), 
there are limits: they are forbidden from knowingly presenting perjured testimony 
or fraudulent documents.205 
Still, it’s often tempting to assume that documentary evidence is authentic, ra-
ther than forged. I suspect that few of us—at least when we were young lawyers who 
hadn’t seen enough of the world around us—would wonder about a document that 
our client hands us: “Is the notarization stamp forged? Does the ostensible signer 
even exist?” 
Yet if your clients dupe you into helping them defraud the court, you may end 
up facing a bar investigation, or possible court-ordered sanctions. The Arizona law-
yers involved in the fake-notarization cases (and other fake-defendant) cases learned 
that.206 Another prominent defamation lawyer was investigated by a state bar, and 
apparently privately informally admonished, though the bar declined to lodge formal 
charges. Even those lawyers who were cleared of any deliberate wrongdoing, such 
as those involved in the Texas Attorney General’s investigation of the Solvera mat-
ter,207 likely faced a considerable amount of work, worry, and expense as a result of 
the investigation. 
Even if you don’t face these formal sanctions, a judge who learns that you filed 
fraudulent documents won’t be happy with you. Just the suspicion that you may have 
been complicit in the fraud will badly damage your credibility, with the judge and 
possibly with the judge’s colleagues. But even if the judge recognizes that your error 
was inadvertent, and the fraud was generated by the client or by a reputation man-
agement company, being easy to fool is not a well-regarded trait in a lawyer.  
 
204 See UTAH COURTS, EXPUNGING ADULT CRIMINAL RECORDS, https://www.utcourts. 
gov/howto/expunge/ [https://perma.cc/8DPU-8FK7]. As with other record requests, the 
court might charge a modest fee for this service. 
205 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11. 
206 See Volokh, Apparently-Fake-Defendant, supra note 71; Parts III & IV. 
207 See Part V. 
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Of course, a lawyer can’t afford to investigate every document that a client 
submits. Many honest clients will legitimately try to get statements from witnesses 
themselves, and hand them to their lawyers in order to minimize legal fees. If you 
tell the client that you need to spend several hours verifying the documents, the client 
may be quite rightly upset. This is likely why some courts take the view that—at 
least for the purposes of Rule 11—lawyers are “entitled to rely on the representations 
of their client[s], without having to assess [their clients’] credibility,”208 at least when 
the lawyer is not on notice that the client is likely lying209 (though other courts dis-
agree210). 
Still, most lawyers would like to do more than avoid sanctionable conduct. 
They would like to avoid even the possibility of participating in a fraud on the court, 
and the reputational damage that this can cause. 
It’s therefore good to at least closely look at the papers. Were you asked to file 
seven lawsuits against supposed Houston residents, all of whose signatures were 
notarized in Northern California? Did the defendant assert that he had created doc-
uments that are housed not just on Ripoff Report or what looks like the defendant’s 
own site, but on a government site, a media site, or a caselaw repository? Is there 
something fishy about the notarization stamp? 
More broadly, if you’re getting the client documents through some third party, 
you might want to look into the third party. Does it, for instance, promote “guaran-
teed takedown” of libelous materials—a guarantee that honest people using honest 
legal techniques likely can’t afford to honestly make? This sort of diligence may 
take some time and effort, and of course, it cannot protect you completely. But it can 
help protect you against some very unpleasant questions if it turns out that your 
client is dishonest.  
 
B.  Preventing Fraud Through Deterrence 
 
1.  Government 
 
Of course, no system of preventing fraud is perfect, and even the imperfect ones 
are often too expensive. So, one important tool for stopping fraud, as with all crimes 
and intentional torts, is the threat of punishment. Some of the stratagems I describe 
 
208 Jeffreys v. Rossi, 275 F. Supp. 2d 463, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Braun ex rel. 
Advanced Battery Techs., Inc. v. Zhiguo Fu, 2015 WL 4389893, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 
2015) (“[A]n attorney who relies on a client’s verification made under the penalty of perjury 
is not acting in bad faith; indeed, it is unlikely that such reliance would even rise to the level 
of objective unreasonableness.”). 
209 Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 3d 401, 436 
(S.D.N.Y. 2016); Childs v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 29 F.3d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 
1994). 
210 “In light of these facts, . . . counsel is reminded of his duty to reasonably investigate 
the factual and legal grounds before filing further defensive pleadings. He cannot merely rely 
on what his client tells him.” Chemtall, Inc. v. Citi-Chem, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 1390, 1409 n.21 
(S.D. Ga. 1998). 
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here are legally defensible, or at least the illegality is hard to ferret out—but the 
forgeries, at least, are blatantly criminal.211 One might think that people would be 
reluctant to attach a judge’s signature to a document the judge never signed. Among 
other things, one might expect that this would upset the judge, and judges tend to 
know prosecutors and are likely to be able to persuade them to act. 
Yet the forgers weren’t deterred, and perhaps for good reason: Very few of the 
forgeries actually did lead to prosecutions, even when the judges or prosecutors were 
alerted to the problem. Perhaps I am mistaken, but my sense is that prosecutors’ 
attention is often hard to get, at least when there are no dead bodies, no missing 
millions, and no kilos of cocaine. 
And when there have been prosecutions, they are often invisible and thus do 
little to deter people. In 2014, music businessman Don Lichterman was federally 
prosecuted for forging a libel takedown order and pleaded guilty.212 But to my 
knowledge, there was no coverage of the prosecution nor even a U.S. Department 
of Justice press release (something that sometimes happens with other federal pros-
ecutions or even federal civil enforcement actions). No publication covered the pros-
ecution, other than when I found it two years later and wrote about it on my blog.  
The 2014 state prosecution of Garner Ted Aukerman likewise got no cover-
age.213 To my knowledge, the first serious coverage happened in 2017, when the 
DOJ put out a press release about the Michael Arnstein prosecution, and some pub-
lications covered the story (as did I on my blog, then hosted on the Washington Post 
site).214 Of course, prosecutors have limited resources, and perhaps their decisions 
not to prosecute many of the forgers make sense. But if there are to be prosecutions, 
it seems to me that it makes sense to publicize them so as to maximally deter other 
would-be forgers and defrauders.  
 
211 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 505 (barring forgery of federal judges’ signatures or seals). 
212 Sealed Complaint, United States v. Lichterman, No. 1:14-mj-02735-UA (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Dec. 5, 2014); Judgment in a Criminal Case, United States v. Lichterman, No. 1:15-cr-
00302-JGK (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2016) (the precise charge was “Forging A Court Seal”). 
213 See Judgment & Sentence for Indirect Criminal Contempt, Aukerman v. Adams, 
No. 2013-33765-FMCI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Volusia Cty. Feb. 5, 2014); see also supra note 46 and 
accompanying discussion.  
214 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, S.D.N.Y, Businessman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Forge 
a Federal Judge’s Signature (Sept. 15, 2017), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/busi-
nessman-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-forge-federal-judge-s-signature [https://perma.cc/9ALF-
W8WC]; Ruth Brown, Jewelry Seller Forged Court Docs to Scrub Bad Reviews from 
Google, N.Y. POST (Oct. 31, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/10/31/jewelry-seller-
forged-court-docs-to-scrub-bad-reviews-from-google/ [https://perma.cc/74E9-YE97]; Kelly 
Weill, Jeweler Forged Judge’s Signature to Force Google to Kill Negative Reviews, DAILY 
BEAST (Sep. 19, 2017, 2:16 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/jeweler-forged-judges-sig-
nature-to-force-google-to-kill-negative-reviews [https://perma.cc/DCG8-5YQF]; Eugene 
Volokh, Opinion, N.Y. Businessman Prosecuted for Forging Court Orders to Send to Google 
for Deindexing, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:51 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/19/n-y-businessman-prosecuted-for-forging-court-or-
ders-to-send-to-google-for-deindexing/ [https://perma.cc/5VCJ-8DAS]. For additional dis-
cussion of the Arnstein prosecution, see supra at notes 27–30.  
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2.  Search Engines and Web Site Operators 
 
Google has also apparently not done much to try to deter abuse. The page that 
people use to submit deindexing requests backed by court orders does say: 
 
Please note that a copy of each legal notice we receive may be sent to the 
Lumen project (http://www.lumendatabase.org) for publication and anno-
tation . . . . 
We may also send the original notice to the alleged infringer or, if we have 
reason to suspect the validity of your complaint, to the rights holder.215 
 
But Google doesn’t threaten to inform law enforcement about any forgeries, a threat 
that might have scared off at least some submitters. I would think that a supplemen-
tary warning such as this might have been sobering: 
 
If we have reason to think that any court order has been forged or illegally 
altered, or was procured fraudulently, we may also inform law enforce-
ment about it. For examples of people who have been convicted and jailed 
as a result of forgeries, see here, here, and here. For examples of people 
who have been ordered to pay sanctions or fines (of up to $300,000), see 
here and here.216 
 
Google actually does try to deter wrongful Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
takedown requests that claim copyright infringement, and wrongful responses to 
such requests. The “Report alleged copyright infringement” page warns submitters, 
 
IMPORTANT: Misrepresentations made in your notice regarding 
whether material or activity is infringing may expose you to liability for 
damages (including costs and attorneys’ fees). Courts have found that you 
must consider copyright defenses, limitations or exceptions before sending 
a notice. In one case involving online content, a company paid more than 
$100,000 in costs and attorneys fees after targeting content protected by 
the U.S. fair use doctrine. Accordingly, if you are not sure whether mate-
rial available online infringes your copyright, we suggest that you first 
contact an attorney.217 
 
 
215 Submit a Court Order, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_courtor-
der?product=websearch&uraw= [https://perma.cc/38VX-NENR] (last visited Jan. 14, 2020). 
216 The links could go to news accounts or court documents; if Google was hesitant 
about using the names of the people who were punished, it could post copies with the names 
redacted.  
217 Report Alleged Copyright Infringement, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/le-
gal/contact/lr_dmca?product=artists&uraw=&hl=en [https://perma.cc/H6NJ-CF5M] (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2020). 
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Likewise, the “Removing Content from Google” page warns people who want to 
contest copyright takedown requests, 
 
Be aware that there may be adverse legal consequences from abusing this 
process. For example, you could be liable for damages and attorney’s fees 
under section 512(f) of the DMCA if you knowingly misrepresent that the 
content was removed by mistake or misidentification.218 
 
But this isn’t done on the “Submitting a Court Order to Google” page.219 
Yelp, on the other hand, does try to deter at least some sort of legal shenanigans 
(including ones that it views as anti-consumer and not just ones it views as fraudu-
lent). The Yelp page for the dentist who was the plaintiff in Patel v. Chen, for in-
stance, shows—in a special box that has to be clicked before any reviews are visi-
ble— 
 
Consumer Alert: Questionable Legal Threats 
This business may have tried to abuse the legal system in an effort to stifle 
free speech, for example through legal threats or contractual gag clauses. 
As a reminder, reviewers who share their experiences have a First Amend-
ment right to express their opinions on Yelp.220 
 
C.  Preventing and Exposing Fraud Through Public Scrutiny 
 
Google’s deindexing system thus had some vulnerabilities, but it also had one 
important strength: it made the bulk of the deindexing requests publicly accessible. 
As a result, a corresponding strength of the court system—public access to the bulk 
of court records—made it much easier to spot the frauds, and in some measure stop 
them. 
 
1.  Ordinary Court Files 
 
Most of the frauds discussed in this Article were only uncovered because the 
court documents in these cases were publicly accessible. Access to just the court 
dockets (as opposed to the underlying documents) wouldn’t have sufficed. Some 
 
218 Removing Content from Google, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/legal/trouble-
shooter/1114905#ts=1115655%2C1614942 [https://perma.cc/Q4ET-MP3C] (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2020). 
219 Submitting a Court Order to Google, GOOGLE, http://support.google.com/legal/con-
tact/lr_courtorder?product=websearch&uraw= [https://perma.cc/J6LX-FWVG] (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2020). (The page warns submitters that a copy of the takedown request will be posted 
on the Lumen Database, but it doesn’t warn of the risk of prosecution or sanctions for forged 
or fraudulent requests.). 
220 Family & Cosmetic Dental Care, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/biz/family-and-cos-
metic-dental-care-suwanee-2?osq=mitul+patel [https://perma.cc/2EES-73AP] (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2020). 
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forgeries could have been found this way, but others involved modifications to real 
documents in real cases, so catching the forgery required viewing the authentic doc-
ument to compare it against the one submitted to Google. All the non-forgery frauds 
involved real cases, so anyone reviewing the orders generally needed to see the com-
plaints, stipulations, motions, and other filings. 
Indeed, it was often necessary to see even personal information about parties, 
such as the addresses of the ostensible defendants in the fake-defendant cases.221 Of 
the 26 fake-defendant cases discussed in Part III, 23 included defendants’ addresses 
(presumably because court practices in those jurisdictions required them for pro se 
defendants). The lack of any connection in public records between the supposed 
defendants and their supposed addresses helped show that the lawsuits were indeed 
fraudulent. 
In recent years, I have noticed a trend in which libel plaintiffs ask for cases to 
be sealed, in whole or in part.222 Indeed, in part because of my experience with the 
fraudulent orders, I have moved—with some success—to intervene and to unseal 
records in several such cases.223  
It makes sense that even honest plaintiffs, who have genuinely been libeled, 
would want to litigate their cases confidentially. If the libel lawsuit filings are open 
to the public, then people might find them and report on them, in the process dis-
cussing (and thus repeating) the libelous allegations. The “fair report” privilege will 
immunize any such reporters who fairly and accurately summarize the allegations in 
court documents;224 and even a fair and accurate report that makes clear the plaintiff 
 
221 See supra Part III. 
222 See Eugene Volokh, Another Decision Against Sealing Records in Libel Cases, REA-
SON: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 10, 2019, 12:13 PM), https://reason.com/2019/10/10/ 
another-decision-against-sealing-records-in-libel-cases/ [https://perma.cc/FR2Z-6QYU]. 
223 Trial Order, Bouari v. Chaney, No. D-13-473819-D (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark Cty. Mar. 
2, 2018) (unsealing record, in response to my motion to unseal); Motion to Intervene and to 
Unseal the Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal All Documents, Packers Sanitation 
Servs., Inc. v. Acosta, No. CS-2017-206 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Garfield Cty. June 5, 2018) (entire 
case was sealed); Motion of Eugene Volokh to Intervene and Unseal Record Documents, to 
File Via CM/ECF, and to Consider This Motion on an Expedited Basis, Parson v. Farley, 
352 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (N.D. Okla. 2018) (No. 16-cv-423-JED-TLW) (alleged libel sealed); 
Motion of Eugene Volokh to Intervene and to Unseal Record, Doe v. Does, No. 1:16-cv-
07359 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2018) (alleged libel sealed); Notice of Motion and Motion, Fargo 
v. Tejas, No. BC685343 (Cal. Ct. App. May 20, 2019) (alleged libel sealed); Motion to In-
tervene and Opposition to Motion to Seal, Kestenbaum v. Globus, No. 516803/2018 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct., Kings Cty., Oct. 2, 2018) (alleged libel sealed). 
224 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see, e.g., Funk v. 
Scripps Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205, 212 (Tenn. 2019); Salzano v. N. Jersey Media Grp. 
Inc., 993 A.2d 778, 796–97 (N.J. 2010). 
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claims a certain accusation is libelous will still in some measure amplify the allega-
tion. An attempt to restrict speech, for instance, through a lawsuit aimed at getting a 
libel takedown injunction, would thus backfire, even if it were entirely legitimate.225 
But this desire can’t justify an exception to the general openness of court rec-
ords. Courts have long recognized that openness “provide[s] a means . . . by which 
citizens scrutinize and ‘check’ the use and possible abuse of judicial power,” and 
“enhance[s] the truth finding function of the proceeding.”226 Likewise, openness pro-
vides a means by which citizens might be able to determine whether judges may 
have too readily accepted proposed orders (for instance, by uncritically accepting a 
proposed order that lists documents that the defendant clearly had not written)—or 
whether they were just duped by a crafty scheme involving fake defendants. And 
such openness is especially important in default judgment and stipulated judgment 
cases, where the orders aren’t policed by any adversarial process. 
“Access to records serves the important functions of ensuring the integrity of 
judicial proceeding.”227 “Public scrutiny of trials creates accountability, minimizing 
judicial error and misconduct, and thus benefits the litigants, defendants and society 
as a whole.”228 The cases discussed here show that such public scrutiny can help 
expose litigant misconduct as well as judicial misconduct, and expose judicial errors 




225 This is often known as the “Streisand Effect,” named after singer Barbra Streisand. 




Ms Streisand inadvertently gave her name to the phenomenon in 2003, when 
she sued the California Coastal Records Project, which maintains an online pho-
tographic archive of almost the entire California coastline, on the grounds that its 
pictures included shots of her cliffside Malibu mansion, and thus invaded her pri-
vacy. 
That raised hackles online. . . . As the links proliferated, thousands of people 
saw the pictures of Ms Streisand’s house—far more than would otherwise ever 
have bothered to browse through the CCRP’s archives. By the time a judge even-
tually threw the suit out, Ms Streisand’s privacy had been far more thoroughly 
compromised than it would have been had she and her lawyers left the CCRP 
alone. 
 
Id. The Streisand case involved a frivolous lawsuit, but the effect can apply to well-founded 
lawsuits as well. 
226 NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 366 (Cal. 1999). 
227 Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(cleaned up). 
228 B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 301 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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2.  The Lumen Database 
 
Of course, forged court orders by definition can’t be found in court files; I found 
nearly all of them through the Lumen Database, a repository run by the Berkman 
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School and the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation. Google, Twitter, and other companies send takedown requests to Lu-
men for archiving, and Lumen makes them available to researchers. If you think that 
the material uncovered in this Article is useful, thank Lumen. 
Even when it comes to genuine court orders, Lumen is an invaluable supple-
ment to court records. Without seeing the Lumen-archived court orders, I wouldn’t 
have known about most of the cases I am writing about here; only armed with the 
case number from Lumen could I find further records in those cases. 
 
3.  Text-Searchable Dockets 
 
The results of this Article also show the value of text-searchable dockets, 
chiefly those kept by Bloomberg Law, but also those available in Westlaw Dockets 
and Lexis Dockets. For instance, I found many of the fake-defendant cases discussed 
in Part III by searching through the dockets in Bloomberg, Westlaw, and Lexis for 
telltale boilerplate phrases that I saw in Patel v. Chan, such as “Consent Motion for 
Injunction and Final Judgment.” And because those services collect all filed Com-
plaints in some court systems, even when those court systems don’t generally make 
the full text of filed documents freely available, I could find other cases through a 
search for boilerplate in the Complaints, such as the phrase “Dated, so respectfully.” 
 
4.  PACER 
 
What I found also makes me wonder what I didn’t find. Many court systems 
don’t keep their records online, or at least don’t keep them online in a way that 
Bloomberg, Westlaw, and Lexis can download and make searchable. 
The federal court system is an odd hybrid, because—unusually for electronic 
court records systems—it charges money to download dockets, and not just to down-
load documents.229 Because of this, Bloomberg, Westlaw, and Lexis don’t routinely 
have all the federal docket entries available online (since that would cost too much). 
Rather, they generally wait until users who are interested in a case manually ask for 
the docket to be updated; as a result, when you search through federal docket entries, 
 
229 Accessing Court Documents—Journalist’s Guide, U.S. COURTS, https://www.us 
courts.gov/statistics-reports/accessing-court-documents-journalists-guide [https://perma.cc/ 
RM2T-NZXB] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020). Many state court systems provide both dockets 
and documents online for free, but most court systems that charge money make their money 
through charging to download documents or charging for case name searches—in most states 
that keep records online, looking up a case by case number is free. See, e.g., Case Num-
ber/Case Name Search, WASHINGTON COURTS, https://dw.courts.wa.gov/?fa=home.casesea 
rchTerms [https://perma.cc/8YR5-M5E9] (last visited March 14, 2020). 
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you aren’t searching through all docket entries, but only through those that Bloom-
berg, Westlaw, or Lexis happen to have downloaded. 
Many have argued that PACER should be free to the public,230 much like many 
state court systems that provide documents online for free without breaking the bank. 
This would be helpful in many ways, but one is that it would facilitate research. 
Someone who sees a suspicious court filing could find any similar filings in other 
cases and see whether they form a pattern. And that’s true even if PACER itself 
doesn’t provide full-text global searches, but only lets people pull up cases one at a 
time. If PACER were free, then services such as Bloomberg, Westlaw, and Lexis 
could gather the data from PACER and make it searchable for their users, and non-
profit sites such as CourtListener might be happy to provide it for free to the general 
public. 
If PACER documents were entirely free, people could do such searches through 
the text of all the documents, which would be especially useful. But even if just the 
dockets were available for free, then at least people would be able to search the text 
of all the docket entries and not just the limited set that’s currently available on the 
various online services. 
 
D.  Minimizing the Harm of Fraud 
 
However hard one may try to catch and deter fraud, some frauds will be suc-
cessful (especially when they involve default judgments or stipulated judgments, 
where there is no adversarial process to smoke out possible misconduct). Some-
times, recipients of orders will be duped. Sometimes, they may suspect an order is 
unsound, but not be certain. One way of dealing with such situations, and of mini-
mizing the harm of fraud, is by avoiding all-or-nothing approaches; let me offer two 
examples. 
 
1.  Search Engines and Web Site Operators: More Information Rather  
than Removal of Information 
 
Instead of deindexing pages based on court orders, Google could include a link 
to a libel judgment alongside any search result that appears to be covered by the 
judgment, for example: 
 
About 274 results (0.51 seconds)  





230 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Attacking a Pay Wall that Hides Public Court Filings, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), http://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/04/us/politics/pacer-fees-law-
suit.html [https://perma.cc/8A45-P3NT]. 
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Mar 4, 2013 - Xyzzy.com John Smith Fraud and Deceptive, Internet. 
Ripoff report against Xyzzy.com. Don’t let them get away with it! 
[This post has been found false and defamatory by this libel judg-
ment.] 
 
Yelp might post such a note alongside reviews that had been found libelous (and 
perhaps exclude them from the star average rating that it calculates for each site, and 
that many users heavily rely on); WordPress could include it on a WordPress-hosted 
page that is the subject of such an order.  
I expect that many libel plaintiffs wouldn’t be satisfied with such a counter-
speech remedy. Most of us would prefer to look like we had never been accused, 
rather than accused but vindicated. But perhaps posting the judgment might still be 
the best bet, given that there’s reason to suspect that many such libel judgments are 
not entirely reliable. Or perhaps a company might have a policy of (1) sometimes 
removing material for which there is a libel judgment if the judgment seems espe-
cially trustworthy—perhaps when there has been a trial at which the defendant was 
present—but (2) just posting a note about the judgment, without removing the ma-
terial, if there are some questions about the judgment’s soundness. 
Indeed, one prominent complaint site, Ripoff Report, notes at least some libel 
judgments, but usually doesn’t take down the speech: 
 
In some cases, a Court may find that specific statements made by the 
author of a Ripoff Report are false and defamatory. When both sides of a 
dispute appear and contest the facts of a situation in court it is believed 
that the findings of the court are generally reliable and fair.  
Out of respect for the courts and the judicial process, Ripoff Report, 
upon request, may post that kind of finding with special prominence. In 
some cases, Ripoff Report may even redact the information specifically 
identified by the court as false from the original Report. Of course, in order 
to do that, Ripoff Report needs to see the specific finding of the Court and 
those findings (meaning the Judgment itself) needs to be self-explanatory, 
i.e., containing specific identification of the Report(s) at issue and specific 
identification of the statement(s) that were found to be false in the Re-
port(s).  
We often get people who provide us with default judgments or stip-
ulated orders that does not consider evidence, and ask us to consider Re-
port redaction content based on that. Those types of judgments don’t meet 
our criteria. In that case, we advise people to post their default judgment 
or stipulated order, and whatever other sort of supporting documentation 
they have, as a Rebuttal to the Report, and to tell their side of the story.231 
 
 
231 Ripoff Report Legal Department, RIPOFF REPORT, http://www.ripoffreport.com/le-
gal [https://perma.cc/4DFB-9JLE] (last visited Feb. 28, 2020) (paragraph breaks added). 
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Some are skeptical of the merits of such complaint sites generally; but if you think 
they are valuable forums for consumer comments, then prominently posting court 
judgments this way may be a reasonable compromise.232 
This sort of remedy is especially apt for newspapers and similar media. If a 
source quoted in an article has stipulated to a judgment that the statement is false (as 
in the orders discussed in Part IX), a reader reading the article would want to know 
that. But the newspaper may be rightly reluctant to just let the story—or even a por-
tion of the story—vanish down the memory hole, especially if it thinks the stipula-
tion may have stemmed from fear of legal costs or a change of heart, rather than 
from a genuine admission that the accusations were false. A disclaimer can give 
readers more information rather than taking information out of the public domain. 
 
2.  Courts: Limiting the Binding Scope of Orders 
 
Successful libel plaintiffs have sometimes argued that they should be able to 
enforce anti-libel injunctions not just against the defendants, but also against online 
service providers that host the libelous speech—Yelp, WordPress, and the like.233 
They have even argued that they should be able to enforce the injunctions against 
search engines that index the speech.234 Trial courts sometimes do order Google and 
other search engines to deindex material,235 though my sense is that Google fights 
such orders if plaintiffs attempt to enforce them,236 and generally persuades the 
 
232 Prominently posting such judgments may also be reasonable even for default judg-
ments and stipulated orders, even though they involve a higher risk of fraud than does a 
judgment in a contested case. Often the defendant really is not findable or really does stipu-
late to a judgment because the statements really are defamatory. Even if a judgment in such 
a case does not merit a site’s removing the criticism, it should merit at least prominent post-
ing, since reasonable readers would find it especially noteworthy. 
233 See Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (rejecting argument that Yelp was 
obligated to take down material based on libel judgment against Yelp poster); Blockowicz 
v. Williams, 630 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting argument that Ripoff Report was 
obligated to take down material based on libel judgment against Ripoff Report poster). 
234 See Google, Inc. v. Expunction Order, 441 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014) (re-
jecting argument that Google was obligated to deindex material based on expungement or-
der).  
235 See, e.g., Order, Toussant v. Williams, No. 2:14-cv-04266-ER (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 
2015), ECF No. 36; Order, Glennon v. Rosenblum et al., No. 5:16-cv-00804-MHH (N.D. 
Ala. Aug. 14, 2018) ECF No. 41, at 1 ¶ 1; Final Judgment, May v. Von Drechsel, No. 296-
01125-2019 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Collin Cty. Apr. 25, 2019); Orders Requiring Removal of Posts, 
ECF Nos. 45-47, Reiterman v. Abid, No. 8:19-cv-02282 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2020). 
236 See generally Google, Inc. v. Expunction Order, 441 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2014). 
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plaintiffs to change the order into a nonbinding request.237 Trial courts likewise 
sometimes order to platforms to remove material.238 
Appellate courts have rejected such attempts to view libel judgments against 
posters as binding on platforms or search engines, most recently in the California 
Supreme Court’s Hassell v. Bird decision.239 But three of the seven Justices in Has-
sell would have accepted the argument; they thought Yelp (the service provider in 
that case) could be required to take down a review that was the subject of a default 
judgment obtained by lawyer Dawn Hassell against the ostensible reviewer, Ava 
Bird. This would be fine, one of the dissenting Justices concluded, because “the trial 
court ordered Yelp to remove postings that have been already adjudicated to be de-
famatory.”240 Another dissenter likewise reasoned that, “Nothing is excessively bur-
densome as a matter of law about the removal of posts a California court has deemed 
defamatory, even if Yelp would much prefer to wash its hands of this responsibil-
ity.”241 Likewise, the court below had concluded that Yelp could be required to abide 
by the injunction against Bird because the injunction “was issued following a deter-
mination . . . that those statements are defamatory.”242 Indeed, there is currently a 
pending U.S. Senate bill that would require Google and Internet service providers to 
remove material “that has been determined by a Federal or State court to vio-
late . . . . State defamation law.”243 
But this Article shows that a trial court’s “adjudicat[ing]” something to be de-
famatory (or “deem[ing]” it defamatory) may not tell us much about whether it’s 
actually defamatory—especially when the judgment was a stipulated judgment or a 
default judgment. If parties stipulate to some facts, the judge won’t second-guess 
them. If a defendant chooses not to contest a case, the judge will generally accept 
the plaintiff’s factual claims.244  
It may be fair to bind the defendant to the judgment in such a case. But there is 
little reason to think that the judgment is factually reliable enough to be trusted by 
 
237 Amended Order, ECF No. 56, Reiterman v. Abid, No. 8:19-cv-02282, at 3 (M.D. 
Fla., Mar. 31, 2020) (replacing the earlier order commanding Google to deindex materials, 
ECF No. 46, with one “encourag[ing]” Google to do so). 
238 Orders Requiring Removal of Posts, ECF Nos. 41-44, 48, Reiterman v. Abid, No. 
8:19-cv-02282 (M.D. Fla., Mar. 10, 2020) (orders issued to Automattic—which hosts Word-
Press blogs—Change.org, Imgur, Reddit, and the Internet Archive). 
239 Hassell, 420 P.3d at 778–79. 
240 Id. at 803 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
241 Id. at 818 (Cuellar, J., dissenting). 
242 Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1360 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 420 P.3d 
776 (Cal. 2018). The court said that this was “a determination at trial,” id., but the “trial” was 
simply a prove-up hearing for the default judgment, in which only the plaintiff appeared. Id. 
at 1363. 
243 Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act [PACT Act], S.B. 4066, 
116th Cong., 2d Sess., secs. 2(5), 5(c)(1)(A). 
244 “Because the default confesses those properly pleaded facts, plaintiff has no respon-
sibility to provide the court with sufficient evidence to prove them—they are treated as true 
for purposes of obtaining a default judgment.” Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc., 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 774, 787 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  
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third parties. It is said that “the principal purpose of the legal process,” as practiced 
within an adversarial system such as ours, “is not to obtain answers; it is to resolve 
disputes.”245 Whether or not this is an exaggeration in some cases, it’s true for stip-
ulated and default judgments. 
For this reason, such a judgment shouldn’t be imposed as a binding obligation 
on services such as Google, Yelp, or WordPress when they aren’t parties to the liti-
gation. It shouldn’t be imposed on authors whose posts people are trying to get re-
moved or deindexed (but who often aren’t directly sued). And it shouldn’t be im-
posed on readers, who are denied the information in those posts—information that 
plaintiff may claim is libelous, but that has never been reliably determined to be 
libelous in a trustworthy adversarial process.246 
Indeed, the Due Process Clause should preclude viewing Yelp, Google, and the 
like as being bound by injunctions in cases in which they were not parties: “One is 
not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated 
as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process”247—a rule 
that is part of our “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own 
day in court.”248 And the pattern of frauds discussed above helps show that this deep-
rooted tradition remains wise today. 
Indeed, it seems that Internet company discretion is the best (though imperfect) 
way of dealing with the epidemic of questionable court orders. Such discretion 
leaves companies free to investigate such submitted orders, including by requiring 
submitters to provide more information.  
Say, for instance, that Google sees that an order includes an article in the Davis 
Enterprise, the Ventura County Star, or Inc. magazine, a Web page on the California 
Department of Real Estate site, a federal district court order hosted on a federal gov-
ernment computer, or a court decision listed on findlaw.com.249 Google can use its 
discretion to disregard such an order, at least until the plaintiff provides some serious 
proof that the media or government entities were indeed found to have libeled the 
plaintiff. And taking away this discretion would give unscrupulous reputation man-
agement companies an especially strong incentive to do whatever it takes to get such 
an order. 
 
245 Michael J. Saks, Enhancing the Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, 51 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 244 (1988).  
246 See McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that removing or 
restricting speech “had the potential to harm nonparties to the litigation because enjoining 
speech harms listeners as well as speakers”). 
247 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893 (2007). Justice Kruger’s concurrence in the 
judgment in Hassell likewise concluded that the Due Process Clause barred imposing obli-
gations on Yelp flowing from the order against Bird; the plurality opinion didn’t reach the 
issue, because it held in Yelp’s favor under a federal statute, 47 U.S.C. § 230. Hassell, 420 
P.3d at 778–79, 794. 
248 Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892–93. 
249 For examples of injunctions that people were using to try to deindex such material 
from those sites, see Parts III, VIII, and IX. 
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To be sure, in theory, there is an alternative way of giving companies an oppor-
tunity to decline deindexing or removal demands—requiring them to affirmatively 
intervene in a case to challenge a suspicious order, if they think they have a basis to 
doubt the order and therefore wish to avoid enforcing it. But it seems to me that this 
would unduly burden those companies: 
 
The law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing 
the burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a 
stranger. . . . Unless duly summoned to appear in a legal proceeding, a per-
son not a privy may rest assured that a judgment recovered therein will not 
affect his legal rights.250 
 
Because of this, “a party seeking a judgment binding on another cannot obligate 
that person to intervene; he must be joined.”251 Title 47 U.S.C. § 230252—which 
generally immunizes online platforms from liability for their users’ speech—might 
make any such attempt to directly join Google, Yelp, or WordPress substantively 
fruitless (as the Hassell majority indeed held). But in any event, procedurally, such 
companies can’t be bound by a judgment in which they did not participate, whether 
or not they have an opportunity to intervene after the fact. 
In practice, intervention is also unlikely to be difficult and expensive. It would 
require finding and engaging local counsel, who would need to write the motion to 
intervene, conduct possibly extensive discovery, attend hearings, further brief argu-
ments, and so on. The bill could easily reach into the tens of thousands of dollars for 
any one case.253 Even if some of this money could be recouped as sanctions in the 
event that plaintiffs are found to have misbehaved in getting the order, much of the 
time the guilty parties will get away without providing full restitution. And some of 
the time, the facts may be ambiguous, or no sanctions may be available (for instance, 
because the plaintiff is a pro se litigant who has no money). 
Moreover, such intervention may be largely precluded by procedural rules. In-
tervention in a case after a judgment has been rendered is rare and disfavored. In 
California, for example, a motion to intervene must be “timely,”254 which generally 
means that it isn’t allowed after a judgment.255 In Arizona, “a motion to intervene 
 
250 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763 (1989) (quoting Chase Nat’l Bank v. Norwalk, 
291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934)). 
251 Id. 
252 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
253 Recall the $71,000 sanctions imposed on the reputation management company in 
Smith v. Garcia, one of the fake-defendant cases discussed in Part III. That amount repre-
sented the attorney fees for the lawyer who proved the documents were fraudulent. See supra 
Part III, at notes 63–75 and accompanying text.  
254 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 387 (West 2017). 
255 Morton Regent Enters., Inc. v. Leadtec Cal., Inc., 74 Cal. App. 3d 842, 846 (Ct. App. 
1977). Although Morton also notes that intervention is allowed after a default judgment 
where “default judgment was rendered . . . because of mistake, surprise, inadvertence or 
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after judgment is considered timely only in extraordinary and unusual circum-
stances.”256  
Other jurisdictions have similar rules. For instance, Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 60 allows a judgment to be reopened because of “fraud . . . , misrepresenta-
tion, or misconduct,” but expressly provides that this may be done only “no more 
than a year after the entry of the judgment.”257 And because victorious plaintiffs can 
control when they present an order to Google, they can deliberately wait until well 
after final judgment has been entered, when any period for possible reopening has 
passed. 
These barriers, both legal and financial, would give Google, Yelp, and similar 
companies a strong incentive not to challenge orders submitted to them, if the orders 
were legally binding absent such a challenge. And there would be little countervail-
ing incentive to bring challenges. After all, such a challenge would primarily benefit 
the author of the posted material, not Google or Yelp itself. Legally, Google and 
Yelp do have First Amendment rights to communicate user-supplied material. But 
practically speaking, they are unlikely to have any deep desire to spend tens of thou-
sands of dollars just as a matter of principle.258 
 
E.  Systems of Libel Liability and 47 U.S.C. § 230 
 
All these phenomena have, of course, arisen in an era when 47 U.S.C. § 230 
has largely immunized online intermediaries from liability posted by third parties;259 
for instance, 
• Google is immunized from liability for excerpting, in search results, pages 
that contain libelous information, and from liability for linking to such 
pages. 
• WordPress is immunized from liability for libels on blogs that they host. 
• Newspapers are immunized from liability for libels in user-posted com-
ments. 
• Yelp and similar sites are immunized from liability for libels posted by 
consumers. 
• So are the complaint sites such as Ripoff Report.  
 
excusable neglect,” id., such an exception might not apply to stipulated judgments. In addi-
tion, having to show legally adequate “mistake, surprise, inadvertence or excusable neglect” 
would often require a great deal of effort and money.  
256 Weaver v. Synthes, Ltd., 784 P.2d 268, 272 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
257 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3), (c)(1).  
258 There are some exceptions, such as Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (liti-
gated by Yelp), and Google, Inc. v. Expunction Order, 441 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014). 
But I suspect that Yelp and Google were willing to spend money on these cases precisely 
because the cases were seen as rare attempts to require platforms to take down posts, and 
litigating them was seen as a good way to set favorable precedent that would help prevent 
many similar future lawsuits. 
259 See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
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In recent years, various people have called for 47 U.S.C. § 230 to be partly 
repealed. These calls generally don’t suggest that search engines or site operators 
should be required to proactively monitor their sites (or the sites they index), since 
that would be extremely burdensome. Instead, they often call for a notice-and-
takedown procedure, similar to that provided by the DMCA for copyright infringe-
ment allegations.260 Someone who alleges he was libeled would inform the interme-
diary about this; the intermediary would then have to choose—either (1) take down 
(or deindex) the material or (2) keep the material but then be subject to a libel lawsuit 
over it.  
Indeed, one proposal—the PACT Act—would expressly strip Internet plat-
forms of libel imunity if they fail to take down material after being sent [a] copy of 
the order of a Federal or State court under which the content or activity was deter-
mined to violate Federal law or State defamation law, and to the extent available, 
any references substantiating the validity of the order, such as the web addresses of 
public court docket information.261 Others have written extensively on § 230 re-
form,262 and I don’t want to repeat that; here, I want to suggest that when we consider 
notice-and-takedown proposals, we need to consider the risk of fraudulent (or at 
least shady) takedown demands, including fraudulently obtained court orders. 
Say, for instance, that WordPress gets a notice that some post on a blog it hosts 
allegedly libels Joe Schmoe. How is WordPress to know whether the post is indeed 
libelous? WordPress would presumably e-mail the blogger to hear his side of the 
story, but the result is likely to be a “Did Not!”/“Did Too!” dispute that WordPress 
may find hard to adjudicate—especially given that both the complainant and the 
blogger might be lying.  
Even if (as with the copyright notice-and-comment regime) the parties are re-
quired to file statements under penalty of perjury,263 we know this is going to be of 
little use. People whose reputations are on the line, and companies hired by those 
people, are often willing to forge court orders, file fraudulent court documents, and 
perjure themselves in court filings. It follows that plenty of people will lie when it 
comes to mere takedown demands and libel lawsuit threats. And hard as it is to get 
prosecutors to prosecute for outright forgery of judges’ signatures, it would likely 
be harder still to get them to prosecute over perjury in documents that never made 
their way to court. 
 
260 See, e.g., Olivera Medenica & Kaiser Wahab, Does Liability Enhance Credibility: 
Lessons from the DMCA Applied to Online Defamation, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 237, 
239 (2007); Lee K. Royster, Fake News: Political Solutions to the Online Epidemic, 96 N.C. 
L. REV. 270, 294 (2017). 
261 Platform Accountability and Consumer Transparency Act (PACT Act), S. 4066, 
116th Cong., 2d Sess., sec. 6(a) (2019). 
262 See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better than the First Amendment, 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 33 (2019); Brent Skorup & Jennifer Huddleston, The Erosion 
of Publisher Liability in American Law, Section 230, and the Future of Online Curation, 72 
OKLA. L. REV. 635 (2020).  
263 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(3)(A)(vi), (g)(3)(C) (2012). 
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This problem is likely to be more severe than with copyright law because a 
typical libel dispute tends to be harder to resolve than a typical copyright dispute. 
An unauthorized literal copy of Game of Thrones posted on someone’s site will usu-
ally be clearly a copy, and will often be clearly unlicensed by HBO and not a fair 
use (especially if it’s a literal copy posted with no commentary, parody, or other 
justification).264 But in libel cases, if someone posts an allegation that some lawyer, 
doctor, or plumber has served him badly, it will often not be at all clear whether that 
allegation is correct. 
And even copyright takedown notices often prove to be unfounded;265 indeed, 
some such notices appear to be part of organized fraudulent schemes. Here is one 
example, for instance, sent to Google in the name of Fox18 News Network LLC, 
asking that Google deindex a New York Daily News article: 
 
Copyright claim #1  
DESCRIPTION the source of my article is being used here . Everything 








The Daily News article did indeed have the same text as Fox18 News, and the 
Fox18 article was dated April 25, 2014, one day before the Daily News article. 
 
264 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
265 See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2296, 2314 (2014); Christina Mulligan, Technological Intermediaries and Freedom of the 
Press, 66 S.M.U. L. REV. 157, 181–84 (2013); Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsi-
bility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1003 (2008) 
(“Because DMCA notice requirements are minimal and ISPs have no incentive to investi-
gate, the notice-and-takedown process can be used to suppress critical speech as well as cop-
yright infringement.”). 
266 See DMCA (Copyright) Complaint to Google, LUMEN, http://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/12082585 [https://perma.cc/2AGH-HWME] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020). 
This example is borrowed from Mostafa El Manzalawy, Data from the Lumen Database 
Highlights How Companies Use Fake Websites and Backdated Articles to Censor Google’s 
Search Results, LUMEN, Aug. 24, 2017, http://www.lumendatabase.org/blog_entries/800 
[https://perma.cc/T4YT-PA9T]. Because the Fox18 News site is no longer up, I am relying 
on El Manzalawy’s research, as well as that on the WebActivism site. See Web Activist, 
Trails Carolina––Investigation for Fraud, Impersonation and Perjury––Fake DMCA 
12224947, WEB ACTIVISM (July 23, 2016), http://www.webactivism.com/trails-carolina-in-
vestigation-for-fraud-impersonation-and-perjury-fake-dmca-12224947/ [https://perma.cc/Z 
7W9-D7ZH]. 
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Things thus looked clear: the Daily News article infringed on the Fox18 article. 
Google therefore apparently deindexed the Daily News article.267 
But how do we know when the Fox18 article was actually posted? We could 
have looked at the date stamp on the article, but that is on Fox18’s site and under its 
control. We might be able to see the creation date of Fox18’s web page, but that too 
is under its control; computer owners can change the creation dates of files on their 
own computers.268 
In fact, tracking down when the Fox18News.com site was registered suggests 
that the site wasn’t even set up until 2016, over a year after the Daily News article 
was posted.269 It is the Fox18 version that’s the copy of the Daily News original—a 
copy backdated to pretend to be the original. And this is just one of many examples 
of this DMCA backdating scam,270 and there are other kinds of fraudulent DMCA 
takedown attempts as well. 
Any notice-and-takedown libel regime would thus pose a challenging task for 
Google, WordPress, and every site, large or small, that allows user comments. Such 
platforms would have to evaluate claims about which allegations are true and false—
what courts are generally supposed to do, however imperfectly—but without the 
tools that courts have: no in-person cross-examination, no subpoena authority, no 
realistic risk of punishment for false statements within the takedown process.271 
 
267 Web Activist, supra note 266. 
268 See also Aseem Kishore, How to Change the Last Modified Date, Creation Date, 
and Last Accessed Date for Files and Folders, ONLINE TECH TIPS (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.online-tech-tips.com/computer-tips/how-to-change-the-last-modified-date-crea-
tion-date-and-last-accessed-date-for-files-and-folders/ [https://perma.cc/RG57-JCRE]. 
269 Web Activist, supra note 266.  
270 See Tim Cushing, Reputation Management Revolution: Fake News Sites and Even 
Faker DMCA Notices, TECHDIRT (Apr. 29, 2016, 8:32 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/arti-
cles/20160424/16230834264/reputation-management-revolution-fake-news-sites-even-
faker-dmca-notices.shtml [https://perma.cc/G328-UFCZ] (examples of similar scams). 
271 A libel notice-and-takedown regime based on the DMCA might call on Google, 
WordPress, and the like to restore taken down material if the author challenges the takedown 
demand, unless the challenger promptly files suit against the author. See 17 U.S.C. § 
512(g)(2)(C) (2012) (contemplating that a service provider would “replace[] the removed 
material and cease[] disabling access to it in [10 to 14] business days following receipt of the 
counter notice,” unless the provider “first receives notice from the person who submitted the 
notification . . . that such person has filed an action seeking a court order to restrain the 
subscriber from engaging in infringing activity relating to the material”). But under such a 
DMCA-based regime, material would still stay down, based just on the takedown demand, 
until the lawsuit is done, which could be many years in the future—a powerful tool for cen-
sorship of any statements that are merely alleged to be libelous, and the analog of ex parte 
preliminary injunctions against libels, which are generally unconstitutional. See Eugene Vo-
lokh, Anti-Libel Injunctions, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 93–96 (2019). The only way to avoid 
such censorship under this DMCA-based regime would be for Google, WordPress, and sim-
ilar companies to examine such takedown demands and see if they seem to have enough 
substantive merit; and that raises all the factfinding concerns discussed in the text. 
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Moreover, the virtue of notice-and-takedown compared to the current regime—
that it would be vastly cheaper and quicker for complainants to use, compared to the 
costs and delays of litigation—would likely become a vice. Imagine that everyone 
can indeed easily and cheaply demand that (say) Google deindex material that alleg-
edly libels them, and (unlike now) their demands have real teeth, in the form of the 
threat that Google would lose its immunity if it rejects the demands. Everyone would 
then, indeed, make such demands. And many of the demands won’t be about genuine 
libels but will be about derogatory opinions, or about claims that are in reality accu-
rate.  
And, as the evidence I’ve gathered suggests, some of those demands would be 
backed by forgeries, fake witnesses, and barefaced lies. If people are willing to do 
that even in court proceedings, in front of government officials with the power to 
jail people for contempt or to impose meaningful financial sanctions, they are likely 
to be much more willing to do so in informal notice-and-takedown proceedings 
where no government official is likely to intervene. 
To be sure, perhaps it’s possible to design some effective notice-and-takedown 
procedure that would minimize the risk that constitutionally protected speech would 
be taken down by intermediaries who are afraid of liability. I certainly can’t rule that 
out. But any such system will create a massive incentive—a far greater incentive 
than under the current system—for complainants to cheat, and it would need to 
somehow be designed to deal with such cheating. 
 
XI.  CONCLUSION 
 
“It’s a basic truth of the human condition that everybody lies . . . the only vari-
able is . . . what they’re willing to lie for.”272 Protecting one’s own reputation and 
livelihood—whether protecting it against lies, against opinions, or against the 
truth—is likely high on many people’s willing-to-lie-for lists. Making money is, too. 
Yet though I don’t think of myself as naïve on this score, the sheer magnitude 
and brazenness of these schemes surprised me. My sense is that it surprised many of 
my colleagues. Perhaps it surprised you. And this reminder of just how common 
fraud can be might help keep us alert to shenanigans in many other fields as well—





For these, I give the purported jurisdiction, the purported parties, and the loca-
tion where they can be found. I don’t include the case numbers and filing dates, 
because there are no real cases and the documents were never filed. Some (unusually 
amateurish) forgeries do not include an express caption; for those, I include the name 
of the apparent beneficiary of the forgery; for those that do include a real caption, I 
have confirmed that (1) no such case exists in the court records, or that (2) the case 
 
272 House: Pilot (NBCUniversal Nov. 16, 2004). 
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exists but that there is no such order in the case, or that (3) there is an order in the 
case for the relevant date but the copy submitted to Google or some other party is an 
altered version of the order that actually appears in the court records: 
1. Alabama, Gregg County (fictional): Order, State v. Redacted, https://www.lu-
mendatabase.org/notices/15172094 [https://perma.cc/KPN6-TV2L] (forging 
expungement order for the nonexistent Gregg County, AL). 
2. Arizona, Maricopa County: Order for Permanent Injunction, Hauca v. Podop-
olis, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/16462661 [https://perma.cc/FY 
Z4-P4L4]. 
3. Arizona, Phoenix: US Support v. Watson, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=165 
65103 [https://perma.cc/4BVH-4XLQ]. 
4. Arizona, Maricopa County: Order, In the Matter Agg DUI-Lic Susp/Rev for 
DUI, 28-1383A1 (F4), Brad Tyler Vorce, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=21724359 [https://perma.cc/H8NM-U2VA] (real case, no docu-
ment in the docket shares a label or the date with those on the Apparently 
Forged Order (Aug. 17, 2018); all documents in the docket are dated Dec. 4, 
2018 or later). 
5. California, Contra Costa County: Pewzner v. Quigley, http://lumendata-
base.org/notices/14081118 [https://perma.cc/LKY7-5SHY] (changing name of 
defendant in real case no. MSC15-00879 from Simonin to Quigley). 
6. California, Los Angeles County: “Judgement” [sic], Dior v. XYZ, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13179169 [https://perma.cc/RQW5-
Q4FE] (using case number from real case of Argyropoulos v. Doe, No. BC 
558812 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Oct. 27, 2015)); see also supra note 41 and 
accompanying text and image.  
7. California, Los Angeles County: Order to Seal Record, California v. Farzam, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=15936937 [https://perma.cc/37EB-EBAL] (ap-
parently forging order to seal the entire record on defendant’s ex parte applica-
tion); see also supra notes 38 and 49 and accompanying text. 
8. California, Los Angeles County: Order Granting Motion for Injunction, Morris 
v. Dirty-World Entertainment Recordings, LLC, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2233687 [https://perma.cc/8KFU-G744] (purported case num-
ber is 12-3-456789-1, which appears not to exist in court records; the purported 
judge is “Pamela J.L. Brown, Circuit Court Judge,” which is a title that does 
not exist in this court; see supra text accompanying note 40).  
9. California, Los Angeles County: Order Granting Motion for Injunction, Morris 
v. Bail Bond City, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12886152 
[https://perma.cc/KHX6-V3WP] (see item 8 supra). 
10. California, Los Angeles County: Order Granting Motion for Injunction, Morris 
v. Bail Bond City, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12913153 
[https://perma.cc/TTW6-FNUR] (see item 8 supra). 
11. California, Los Angeles County: Default Judgment, Shaloub v. Ripoff Report, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/14092054 [https://perma.cc/ES6F-Y9YS] 
(using case number of Elite Consultants and Management Inc. v. Jason Mock 
et al., No. BC605175 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 23, 2015)). 
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12. California, Los Angeles County: Order, A Hollywood Ending Studios, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/16415984 [https://perma.cc/37TN-GLE4] 
(purported order contains no caption, case name, case number, or specific 
facts). 
13. California, Los Angeles County: Kamran Syed, http://lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/16417242 [https://perma.cc/PF9S-K8DK] (purported order contains no 
caption, case name, case number, or specific facts). 
14. California, Los Angeles County: Kamran Kastle, http://lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/16415983 [https://perma.cc/SB3Z-2SQM] (purported order contains no 
caption, case name, case number, or specific facts). 
15. California, Los Angeles County: Stipulated Final Judgement [sic], Correira v. 
Kenefick, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/17541230 [https://perma. 
cc/BA74-236Q]. 
16. California, Mono County: Default Judgment, Khorasani v. Sampson, http://lu-
mendatabase.org/?sid=1037493 [https://perma.cc/BJS8-8WP8]; see also supra 
note 43 and accompanying text. 
17. California, Mono County: Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Giunta v. 
Bosley, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1896816 [https://perma.cc/U4YU-
6ZTV]; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
18. California, Plumas County: Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction Increase 
Visibility v. Ruiz, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2164422 [https://perma.cc/J 
U7G-C7PX]; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
19. California, Plumas County: Increase Visibility v. Thomas, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2174997 [https://perma.cc/XM9K-DPP8]; see also supra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
20. California, Plumas County: Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction, 
Schwartzapfel v. Goldstein, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1657779 
[https://perma.cc/7FYJ-DT66] (same plaintiff as Final Judgment and Perma-
nent Injunction, Schwartzapfel v. Guidry, No. 2014-42698 (Tex. Harris Cty. 
Dist. Ct. July 25, 2014)); see also notes 43 and 51 and accompanying text. 
21. Colorado, Arapahoe County: Findings and Order on Petitioner’s Verified Peti-
tion for Expungement of Records, In re Neil Kiggen, https://lumendata-
base.org/notices/21355519 [https://perma.cc/W8Y7-KPVB]. 
22. Connecticut: Memorandum Opinion and Order, Haas v. Berriault, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/14045627 [https://perma.cc/5HYJ-
S9ND] (purported case number, 13-cv-1569, and case name appear not to exist 
in court records) (purporting to be issued by the Conn. Super. Ct., using the 
name of real federal judge from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois, John W. Darrah, who died in 2017; this is the same judge’s name 
used in the apparently forged documents in: Katelanis v. Blockshopper LLC, 
supra note 36 and infra Appendix A, No. 36, and State v. Pennant, supra note 
47 and infra Appendix A, No. 23); see also supra note 37. 
23. Connecticut: Order of Dismissal, State v. Pennant, https://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/14718291 [https://perma.cc/6U7L-J24T] (purporting to be is-
sued by the Conn. Super. Ct., using the name of real federal judge from the 
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U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, John W. Darrah, who 
died in 2017). This is the same judge’s name used in the apparently forged 
documents in Haas v. Berriault, supra note 37 and Appendix A, No. 22, and 
Katelanis v. Blockshopper LLC, supra note 36 and infra Appendix A, No. 36. 
This forgery resulted in Pennant’s prosecution and sentencing to one year in 
jail. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (citing State v. Pennant, No. 
T19R-CR18-0111799-S (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 22, 2019)).  
24. Federal, C.D. Cal.: Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Seal Documents, United 
States v. Fontaine, https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178352 [https://perma. 
cc/W9ZE-494P] (real case, but no such order in the case). See Minute Entry, 
Order Granting In Part Petitioner’s Ex Parte Motion to File Documents under 
Seal, United States v. Fontaine, No. 2:94-cr-00386-CBM (C.D. Cal. June 6, 
2008)). 
25. Federal, D. Denver [sic]: Order, Kiggen v. Call Center Management, https://lu-
mendatabase.org/notices/21342819 [https://perma.cc/ZL6N-WAVU]. 
26. Federal, D.N.J.: Opinion and Order, CommScope Inc. v. Milman Smith, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13004762 [https://perma.cc/G9WY-HXUZ]. 
27. Federal, D.N.J.: Order to Vacate Attorney Suspensions, Walterscheid v. State 
Bar (on file with author). 
28. Federal, D. Ore.: Stipulated Judgment and Permanent Injunction, IEPlexus v. 
Harmon, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2359995 [https://perma.cc/YC4J-
SCQK]. 
29. Federal, D.R.I.: Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judg-
ment, Maziar v. Garcia, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13449795 
[https://perma.cc/6V3K-TNTR] (using much of the same text as Order Grant-
ing Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judgment, Smith v. Garcia, No. 
16-144 S, 2017 WL 412722 (D.R.I. Apr. 22, 2016)); see also supra note 51. 
30. Federal, E.D. Mich.: Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction, Motamedi 
v. Oesterblad, https://lumendatabase.org/notices/11741554 [https://perma.cc/ 
A8RH-PTCT].  
31. Federal, E.D. Pa.: Permanent Injunction, Gorman v. Steinborn, http://lumenda-
tabase.org/?sid=2338651 [https://perma.cc/6V5V-YGWP] (copy of real order 
in Gorman v. Steinborn, No. 2:14-cv-00890-GAM (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2015), 
but with the URL approved by the judge replaced by a different URL); see also 
supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
32. Federal, E.D. Pa.: Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, 
Manley v. NAVMAR, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/17164539 
[https://perma.cc/6G5B-E88U] (copying caption, case number, and judge’s 
signature from Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion and Granting Defendant’s 
Motion to Dismiss, Manley v. Navmar Applied Sciences Corp., No. 2:12-cv-
05493 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013)); see also Apparently Forged Order Removal 
of Defamatory Contents on Internet, Manley v. Ellarbee and Thompson, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/17164539 [https://perma.cc/6G5B-
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E88U] (copying stamp and case number of Complaint at 1, Manley v. Lock-
heed Martin, No. 1-17-cv-1320 (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 13, 2017)); see also supra 
note 33. 
33. Federal, E.D. Tenn.: Order, Hubbard v. City of McMinnville Police Dep’t, 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/15369288 [https://perma.cc/AR78-
VK2F] (using header, judge’s signature, and footer from Order to Pay Filing 
Fee, Hubbard v. City of McMinnville Police Dep’t, No. 4:17-cv-37 (E.D. Tenn. 
Sept. 25, 2017)). 
34. Federal, E.D. Tex.: Ginn v. Farid, https://www.lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/20215041 [https://perma.cc/S6GR-NWCU] (copy of real order, but with 
the URL approved by the judge replaced by a different URL). 
35.  “Judgement Entry” [sic], State v. Mazer, http://www.lumendatabase.org/no-
tices/17665123 [https://perma.cc/DU4F-D2TL] (purporting to be an order in 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, but using the name 
of the Ohio state judge (Hon. Donald Oda) and docket number in State of Ohio 
v Aukerman, No. 14CR29792 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. filed Jan 21, 2014), discussed 
supra at note 39); see also supra note 32. 
36. Federal, N.D. Ill.: “Memorandum Opinion and [sic] O.rper” [sic], Katelanis v. 
Blockshopper LLC, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/16161042 
[https://perma.cc/AG3G-8H6P]; see also supra note 36. This document uses 
the same (inaccurate) judge name as used in State v. Pennant, supra note 47 
and Appendix A, No. 23, and Haas v. Berriault, supra note 37 and Appendix 
A, No. 22.  
37. Federal, S.D. Fla.: Order, Louis Vuittons Malletier v. GummistiefelProfis.de, 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/17514569 [https://perma.cc/2JCR-
4MNG].  
38. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12549270 
[https://perma.cc/VL4M-WCJ2]. This item and the following ones related to 
the Arnstein case all involved a real order, Walter Arnstein, Inc., v. Transpacific 
Software Pvt Ltd., No. 11-CV-5079 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2012), but altered to 
change the date and the URLs. For discussion of the real, original court order 
and the 11 apparent forgeries that followed, see supra notes 27–30. 
39. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein v. Transpa-
cific Software, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13298449 [https://perma.cc/H3 
SV-KKE6]. 
40. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178597 
[https://perma.cc/LF8A-F38C]. 
41. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178626 
[https://perma.cc/B8SA-VVQE]. 
42. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178667 
[https://perma.cc/74S4-6KAV]. 
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43. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178727 
[https://perma.cc/QAF5-GZFA]. 
44. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178742 
[https://perma.cc/NXE7-CZAW]. 
45. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178769 
[https://perma.cc/T9BE-HWWQ]. 
46. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178937 
[https://perma.cc/J5Q2-EGYN]. 
47. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., https://lumendatabase.org/notices/13178951 
[https://perma.cc/BHA5-9DPD]. 
48. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: Order for Default Judgment, Walter Arnstein, Inc. v. Trans-
pacific Software Pvt Ltd., http://lumendatabase.org/notices/13844954 
[https://perma.cc/XM9P-9XUX]. 
49. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: [Real] Letter Addressed to Magistrate Judge Netburn from 
Matthew L. Levine, Bringing to Court’s Attention the Possible Forged Court 
Order in Abshier v. Sunset Recordings, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-03227-CM-SN 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2015), ECF No. 103 (real court document, attaching as Ex-
hibit A an Apparently Forged “Proposed Order Granting Motion for Court’s 
Authorization to Delete Certain Web Site Pages,” Sunset Recordings, Inc. and 
Lichterman v. Zdrakov). The federal prosecution of Don Lichterman is dis-
cussed supra at notes 45 and 212. 
50. Federal, S.D.N.Y.: [Real] Order, Abshier v. Sunset Recordings, Inc., No. 1:14-
cv-03227-CM-SN (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2014), ECF No. 88 (order finding an 
apparently forged document in this case, suggesting that Mr. Lichterman pre-
pared it, and revoking Mr. Lichterman’s authorization to file documents in this 
case via the ECF system). The federal prosecution of Don Lichterman is dis-
cussed supra at notes 45 and 212. 
51. Federal, S.D. Tex.: Order to Remove Content, Fernandez v. Doe (on file with 
author) (the case number and document number are the same as in the Iyogi, 
Inc. v. Beeting apparent forgery, cited immediately below). 
52. Federal, S.D. Tex.: Order to Remove Content, Iyogi, Inc. v. Beeting, 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13178566 [https://perma.cc/P4Z2-
T4SH]. 
53. Florida, Leon County: Final Default “Judgement” [sic], Among v. Anonymous 
John Doe 1, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/18883057 [https://perma. 
cc/N7LT-LNE5] (using docket number, jurisdiction and date of Default & Fi-
nal Judgment, Shavolian v. Doe, No. 2014 CA 000845 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 2d Cir., 
Leon Cty. July 8, 2014)).  
54. Florida, Miami-Dade County: Final Judgment, Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. 
Bryson, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13179181 [https://perma.cc/ 
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6LST-8UEM] (apparently forging order by changing URL addresses, but oth-
erwise copying Final Judgment, Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. Bryson, Case 
No. 13-11166 CA 15 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 11th Cir., Miami-Dade Cty. Dec. 17, 
2013)). 
55. Florida, Miami-Dade County: Final Judgment, Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. 
Bryson, perma.cc/JCZ4-FTSA [https://perma.cc/JCZ4-FTSA] (apparently 
forging order by changing URL addresses, but otherwise copying Final Judg-
ment, Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. Bryson, Case No. 13-11166 CA 15 (Fla. 
Cir. Ct., 11th Cir., Miami-Dade Cty. Dec. 17, 2013)). 
56. Florida, Miami-Dade County: Final Judgment Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. 
Bryson, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13179112 [https://perma.cc/ 
P2WB-69WT] (apparently forging order by changing URL addresses, but oth-
erwise copying Final Judgment, Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. Bryson, Case 
No. 13-11166 CA 15 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 11th Cir., Miami-Dade Cty. Dec. 17, 
2013)). 
57. Florida, Miami-Dade County: Final Judgment, MergeworthRX, Inc. v. Ampel, 
http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13179239 [https://perma.cc/TKS9-
WT6Z] (changing case number and party names, but using much of the same 
text as Final Judgment, Allied Medical Supply, Inc. v. Bryson, Case No. 13-
11166 CA 15 (Fla. Cir. Ct., 11th Cir., Miami-Dade Cty. Dec. 17, 2013), includ-
ing leaving in order’s note to send copies to John Bryson); see also supra note 
1 and accompanying text.  
58. Florida, Orange County: Ex Parte Temporary Injunction, Moore v. Steinberg, 
https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13178608 [https://perma.cc/W9HU-
93NH] (based on Ex Parte Temporary Injunction, Moore v. Steinberg, No. 
2012-CA-005204-O (Fla. Cir. Ct., 9th Cir., Orange Cty. Mar. 29, 2012), but 
changing URLs, some party names, and formatting); see also note 51. 
59. Florida, Broward County: Agreed Order, State Certified Contractors, Inc. v. 
Mitchell, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13178052 [https://perma. 
cc/P9GZ-PAFG]. 
60. Florida, Volusia County: Entry and Order Granting Motion to Seal Record, 
Aukerman v. Adams, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13178241 
[https://perma.cc/4XNY-T2C2] (apparently forging 2013 order in real case of 
Aukerman v. Adams, No. 2013-33765-FMCI (Fla. Cir. Ct. Volusia Cty.). See 
notes 46 and 213 and accompanying discussion. A related apparent forgery in-
volving Aukerman also occurred in 2017 in Ohio. See note 39 and accompany-
ing text. 
61. Georgia, Fulton County: Amended Final Default Judgement, Narconon Rehab 
Servs. LLC v. Doe, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=12960667 [https://perma.cc 
/HC93-PCF5]; see also notes 35 and 51 and accompanying discussion.  
62. Illinois, Cook County: Agreed Order, Doe v. Privacy Prot. Servs., Inc., No 
2014-L-006608 (Ill. Cir. Ct., Cook/Ill. Cty., Law Div. Feb. 24, 2015) http://lu-
mendatabase.org/?sid=2295684 [https://perma.cc/L8YZ-LVFW] (case num-
ber exists but with different party names; Agreed Order in the original case 
includes different URLs). 
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63. Illinois, Cook County: “Agreed Order of Acknowledgement” [sic], Illinois v. 
Cordogan, http://lumendatabase.org/notices/13555164 [https://perma.cc/3AQ 
Q-TU9T]; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
64. Illinois, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the 6th Mun. Dist. (fictional): Order of Default for 
Failure to Appear and Answer to the Allegations of Online Slander and Defa-
mation, Redman v. Wills, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/13178726 
[https://perma.cc/ALR6-NGQD]. 
65. Kansas, Johnson County: Order, Watson v. Michael (on file with author) (using 
case number and jurisdiction from Miller v. Kendrick, No. 09CV107715 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct., Johnson Cty., Civ. Dept. dismissed Aug. 26, 2009)).  
66. Kansas, Johnson County: Order, Cohen v. Crawford, https://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/18310870 [https://perma.cc/TH3Y-Z5M2]. 
67. Maryland, Baltimore City: Order Granting Default Judgement, Luna v. Munoz, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2360003 [https://perma.cc/6ADM-FZPQ]. 
68. Michigan, Genesee County: “Notice to Cease and Desist Defamation,” 
Moncado v. Thomas, https://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/19474481 
[https://perma.cc/FSP2-M6J6].  
69. Mississippi, Hinds County: Judgment, Sundance Vacations, LLC v. Morgan 
(on file with author).  
70. Missouri, St. Louis County: Notice of Court Ruling of Removal of Published 
Material, Church v. Casper, http://lumendatabase.org/notices/17214045 
[https://perma.cc/JFS5-L6UN] (using docket number of French-Gerleman 
Elec. Co. v. Solar Rich Power, LLC, No 18SL-CC00818 (Mo. Cir. Ct, St. Louis 
Cty. default judgment issued May 9, 2018)). 
71. Missouri, Clay County: “Judgement [sic] and Permanent Injunction,” Wilcox 
v. Tosic, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=1920836 [https://perma.cc/TH6Q-
NLSD] (using docket number of Dorsch v. Clark, No. 12CY-CV14362 (Mo. 
Cir. Ct., Clay Cty. Judgment entered Nov. 27, 2013)). 
72. Nevada, Clark County: Default Judgment, Michaelides v. Chaker, http://lu-
mendatabase.org/notices/20340972 [https://perma.cc/K5AQ-ES84] (based on 
real document, but with May 28, 2019 Application for Default Judgment al-
tered to make it appear that the judgment was actually issued). Court docket 
records show that although default was entered, default judgment was not en-
tered, and the court granted defendant’s motion to set aside default in April 
2020. See Michaelides v. Chaker, No. A-18-779028-C (Nev. Dist. Ct., Clark 
Cty. Apr. 2, 2020). 
73. New Hampshire, Merrimack County: Order of Expungement, State v. Holt, 
http://lumendatabase.org/notices/20049754 [https://perma.cc/F5JG-3XBJ]. 
74. New Jersey, Bergen County: “Agreed Final Judgment and Permanent Injunc-
tion,” 42nd Street Photo, Inc. v. Nguyen, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2364180 [https://perma.cc/Q7KH-CXXP]. 
75. New Jersey, Bergen County: “Agreed Final Judgment and Permanent Injunc-
tion,” Am. Truck Group, LLC v. Rodriguez, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2362326 [https://perma.cc/CX74-EEWY]; see also note 51. 
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76. New Jersey, Bergen County: Judgment by Consent, National Truck Funding, 
LLC v. Rustamov, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2365958 [https://perma.cc/ 
G4U7-PUSP]. 
77. New Jersey, Essex County: Order, [No Case Name Given,] No. 21-40305, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=23229375 [https://perma.cc/KCN2-6E59]. 
78. Ohio, Hamilton County: “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Per-
manent Injunction,” Asia Pacific Resources Int’l Holdings v. “Neomi Wendy 
Chen” (on file with author) (using same docket number as Wild Strawberry 
Entertainment Co. v. John Doe, No. A1407255 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton 
Cty. judgment & injunction granted Mar. 30, 2015)); see also supra note 31. 
79. Ohio, Hamilton County: Order Granting Judgement and Entry of Permanent 
Injunction, Am. Truck Group, LLC v. Your Savior, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2350253 [https://perma.cc/XF6E-KX5M] (using same docket 
number as Adam Meer v. Procter & Gamble Co DBA Old Spice, No. A-
1804003 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. filed July 26, 2018)); see also notes 
51, 52. 
80. Ohio, Hamilton County: Order, Capital Gold Group, Inc. v. Ripoff Report, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2256029 [https://perma.cc/8VAD-DXXJ] (pur-
ported docket number A634109 appears not to exist in court records).  
81. Ohio, Hamilton County: Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent In-
junction Clarkson v. Ali191, http://lumendatabase.org/notices/14041069 
[https://perma.cc/WMA9-R2YQ]; see also supra note 52 and accompanying 
text.  
82. Ohio, Hamilton County: Agreed Judgment and Permanent “Injuction” [sic], 
Friedman v. Wright, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2368931 [https://perma.cc/ 
5YQ5-89VQ]; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
83. Ohio, Hamilton County: “Order Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Perma-
nent Injunction,” IntaCapital Swiss SA v. “IRLGLegal” (on file with author) 
(apparently based on Intacapital Swiss SA v. IRGLegal, No. A-1407254 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. Apr. 17, 2015), but using a later judgment date than 
last item in docket, and including URLs that do not appear in the actual court-
entered judgment); see also supra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text.  
84. Ohio, Hamilton County: Entry Adopting Magistrate’s Decision, Martin v. Ei-
rikis, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2365955 [https://perma.cc/HEA5-SFLC]. 
85. Ohio, Hamilton County: Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent In-
junction Noie v. Seabrook, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2348633 
[https://perma.cc/NN64-AUMR]; see also supra note 52 and accompanying 
text. 
86. Ohio, Hamilton County: Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent In-
junction, Soba Living, LLC v. WILL, http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=2352943 
[https://perma.cc/YP39-ZZ8L]; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
87. Ohio, Hamilton County: “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Per-
manent Injunction, Tranquil Rehab Swiss SA v. Deathhamster,” http://lu-
mendatabase.org/?sid=12987034 [https://perma.cc/NY5C-NQFX] (uses same 
docket number and jurisdiction as real case of Wild Strawberry Entertainment 
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Co. v. John Doe, No. A1407255 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. judgment 
& injunction Mar. 30, 2015)); see also supra notes 35, 51, 52. The same docket 
number is also used in the apparently forged Asia Pacific Resources Int’l Hold-
ings v. “Neomi Wendy Chen,” see supra note 31, and Tranquility Rehab v. 
Billibob, see supra note 35. 
88. Ohio, Hamilton County: “Orders Granting Judgement [sic] and Entry of Per-
manent Injunction,” Tranquility Rehab v. Billibob, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2353293 [https://perma.cc/56Y4-FVA7] (using same docket 
number and jurisdiction as Wild Strawberry Entertainment Co. v. John Doe, 
No. A1407255 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. judgment & injunction Mar. 
30, 2015)); see also supra notes 35, 51, 52. This also uses the same docket 
number and same spelling errors as in Asia Pacific Resources Int’l Holdings v. 
“Neomi Wendy Chen,” supra note 31, and Tranquil Rehab v. Deathhamster, 
supra note 35. 
89. Ohio, Hamilton County: Order Granting Judgment and Entry of Permanent In-
junction, VehicleHistory LLC v. EdInGeorgia, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=2359742 [https://perma.cc/N94T-PQ5F]; see also supra note 52. 
90. Pennsylvania, Montgomery County: Opinion and Order, Spattaco v. Pinaud, 
http://lumendatabase.org/?sid=13385653 [https://perma.cc/AC7T-K6F3] (pur-
porting to be an order of the “State of Pennsylvania, The Judicial Superior 
Court of Montgomery County, Civil Division,” which does not exist). 
91. Pennsylvania, Philadelphia County: Order Granting Consent Motion for In-
junction and Final Judgement, SPR, Inc. v. Doe, http://lumendata-
base.org/?sid=12928496 [https://perma.cc/7QNL-H84M] (copying case num-
ber and caption of Order Granting Consent Motion for Injunction and Final 
Judgment at 1, Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. 
Cty., July 1, 2016), vacated Oct. 21, 2016); see also supra notes 35 and 51. 
92. Pennsylvania, Philadelphia County: Order, CASDAQ Trading v. Go-
Daddy.com LLC, http://www.lumendatabase.org/notices/19326764 
[https://perma.cc/P4CR-WMQX] (copying case number from Nelson v. Spear, 
No. 160600824 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila Cty.)). 
93. Texas, Dallas County: Minute Order, Bonnycastle v. Cityline, http://lumenda-
tabase.org/?sid=1457539 [https://perma.cc/2W3P-N7TL] (claiming to be from 
the “Superior Court of Texas, County of Dallas, Central”; there is no “Superior 
Court” in Texas; the court in Dallas is a District Court; Judge Judith F. Hayes 
was a judge in the Superior Court of San Diego, and her name is misspelled 
under signature line; court reporter listed is also located in California). 
94. Virginia, Fairfax County: Order, Somani v. Lalji (on file with author). 
 
APPENDIX B: 
LAWSUITS THAT SHARE BOILERPLATE WITH THE FAKE-DEFENDANT CASES 
 
It’s impossible to tell for certain that all the cases in Appendix B include fake 
defendants, but the filings and court documents share much of the language with the 
two cases that were vacated on the grounds that they involved fake defendants; and 
312 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
for the 21 other cases that included the purported defendants’ purported addresses, 
there appears not to be any such person associated with such an address. 
These cases were found using Bloomberg Law searches for phrases that ap-
peared in the Patel papers, such as “Consent Motion for Injunction and Final Judg-
ment,” “Dated, so respectfully,” or a phrase like “If the Defendant cannot remove 
the Defamation from the Internet, the Plaintiff shall submit this Order to Google, 
Yahoo, Bing, or any other Internet search engine so that the link can be removed 
from their search results pursuant to their existing policies concerning de-indexing 
of defamatory material.” Though such phrases could appear in unrelated cases, look-
ing through results revealed that many of the orders that use one of the phrases also 
use several others, and thus appear to come from the same source (even though all 
are ostensibly pro se lawsuits). For further discussion of these cases and why they 
appear suspicious, see supra Part III. 
1. Glatter v. Castle, No. SC125890 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. order granted June 
24, 2016).  
2. Glatter v. Castle, No. 184324 (Cal. Super. Ct. Shasta Cty. filed Mar. 3, 2016). 
3. Lyman v. Bernard, No. LC104275 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. order granted June 
22, 2016).  
4. Serenbetz v. McDonald, No. BC621992 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. dismissed 
because plaintiff failed to appear Oct. 11, 2016). 
5. Williams v. Li, No. L15-03752 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa Cty. order granted 
Dec. 28, 2015). 
6. Carter v. Quinn, No. 2016-021440-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Miami-Dade Cty. vol-
untarily dismissed Oct. 10, 2016).  
7. Wasserman v. Mack, No. 2016CA002402000000 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Polk Cty. order 
granted July 28, 2016).  
8. Cast v. Pawloski, No. 2016-CH-09649 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. filed Jul. 22, 
2016, voluntarily dismissed Nov. 21, 2016). 
9. Jones v. Conti¸ No. 24C15006945 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City order granted Dec. 
21, 2015). 
10. Norbu v. Campbell, No. 24-C-16-00250 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City filed Jan. 19, 
2016, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction July 18, 2016).  
11. Patel v. Chan, No. 24C16003573 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City order granted July 22, 
2016). 
12. Ruddie v. Kirschner, No. 24C15005620 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City order granted 
Dec. 14, 2015). 
13. Tanoto v. Brown, No. 24C16000901 (Md. Cir. Ct. Balt. City dismissed Sept. 
21, 2016).  
14. Hanne v. Garcia, No. 12-C-16-001705 (Md. Cir. Ct. Harford Cty. order granted 
June 27, 2016).  
15. Norbu v. Campbell, No. 12-C-16-001959 (Md. Cir. Ct. Harford Cty. order 
granted July 18, 2016).  
16. Tanoto v. Brown, No. 12-C-16-001958 (Md. Cir. Ct. Harford Cty. order 
granted July 20, 2016).  
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17. Mohlman v. Jones, No. 13C16107924 (Md. Cir. Ct. Howard Cty. order denied 
June 15, 2016). 
18. Benedict v. Matthews, No. A16738922C (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark Cty. order 
granted July 12, 2016).  
19. Horner v. Davis, No. A16738996C (Nev. Dist. Ct. Clark Cty. filed June 23, 
2016). 
20. Callagy v. Roffman, No. 160603108 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. order granted 
July 1, 2016, vacated Oct. 20, 2016).  
21. Murtagh v. Reynolds, No. 160901262 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. order denied 
Oct. 26, 2016).  
22. Nelson v. Spear, No. 160600824 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. filed June 14, 
2016). 
23. Talson v. Martinez, No. 160603109 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. Cty. Com. Pl. order 
granted July 1, 2016). 
24. Olea v. James, No. 2016-49734 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. filed July 27, 2016, 
dismissed for lack of prosecution Jan. 4, 2018).  
25. Smith v. Garcia, No. 1:16-cv-00144, 2017 WL 412722 (D.R.I. order granted 
Apr. 22, 2016, vacated Jan. 31, 2017). 
26. Mohlman v. Jones, No. H-16-0274 (S.D. Tex. dismissed for lack of diversity 
Feb. 4, 2016). 
 
APPENDIX C: 
OUT-OF-STATE ORDERS WITH CALIFORNIA NOTARIZATIONS 
 
Seven Harris County, Texas orders from one lawyer; the defendants’ signatures 
in these cases were notarized in Alameda, Contra Costa, Sacramento, or Solano 
Counties—basically, the San Francisco to Sacramento corridor: 
 
1. Waiver of Service, BCI Property Management v. Ramos, No. 2016-29570 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. filed May 5, 2016). 
2. Waiver of Service, Eccentric Holdings v. Largo, No. 2016-61892 (Tex. Dist. 
Ct. Harris Cty. filed Sept. 22, 2016). 
3. Defendant’s Original Answer, Fox & Assocs. v. Wallace, No. 2016-06674 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. filed Feb. 1, 2016). 
4. Waiver of Service, Grisak Properties v. Baroro, No. 2016-46539 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Harris Cty. filed July 14, 2016). 
5. Waiver of Service, Holdren v. Ortega, No. 2016-49421 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris 
Cty. filed July 26, 2016).  
6. Waiver of Service, Kosage v. Nelson, No. 2016-39989 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris 
Cty. filed June 9, 2016).  
7. Waiver of Service, Tax Help Services v. Smalls, No. 2016-12697 (Tex. Dist. 
Ct. Harris Cty. filed Feb. 29, 2016). 
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Seven Harris County, Texas orders from a mix of other lawyers; the defend-
ants’ signatures were notarized in Alameda, Contra Costa, Solano, and (in one case) 
Los Angeles Counties: 
 
8. Waiver of Service, Amovious Networks v. Edwards, No. 2016-45988 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. filed July 28, 2016).  
9. Waiver of Service, Med Link Networking Solutions v. Jones, No. 2016-24479 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. filed Apr. 29, 2016). 
10. Waiver of Service, Somerset v. Galvan, No. 2016-07791 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris 
Cty. filed Feb. 5, 2016). 
11. Waiver of Service, RF Holdings v. Tibay, No. 2015-67469 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Har-
ris Cty. filed Dec. 18, 2015). 
12. Waiver of Service, RBJ Enters. v. Alexander, No. 1071267 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Har-
ris Cty. filed Dec. 29, 2015).  
13. Waiver of Service, MB Ventures v. Medina, No. DC-16-05087 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 
Dallas Cty. filed Apr. 29, 2016).  
14. Sworn Statement of Defendant Anthony Guidry, Schwartzapfel v. Guidry, No. 
2014-42698 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris Cty. filed July 25, 2014).  
 
Five Ohio orders, all from the same lawyer; the defendants’ signatures were no-
tarized in Contra Costa, Santa Clara, and Solano counties: 
 
15. Sworn Statement of Defendant Richard Williamson, ASIAUSA v. Williamson, 
No. CV-15-841465 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty. Apr. 3, 2015).  
16. Affidavit of Nuuanu Kahapeachow, Dr-Max Limited v. Kahapeachow, No. 
CV-16-858256 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty. Mar. 10, 2016).  
17. Sworn statement of Defendant Stacy Dinsdale, Gossels Casting v. Dinsdale, 
No. CV-2015-05-2812 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Summit Cty. June 18, 2015). 
18. Affidavit of Hamie Valencia, Premiere Casting Events v. Valencia, No. 
16CV005975 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Franklin Cty. Aug. 16, 2016).  
19. Affidavit of Samantha Peralto, Shatsman v. Peralto, No. CV-2015-12-5717 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Sumit Cty. Jan. 21, 2016). 
 
Two cases from other states, with notarizations in San Francisco and in Solano 
County; the Florida case was filed by a lawyer at the same firm where the lawyer 
involved in the Ohio cases was practicing at the time, and the Maryland case was 
apparently submitted to Google by the Ohio lawyer, https://www.lumendata-
base.org/notices/12982683 [https://perma.cc/Y2ND-LAMG]: 
 
20. Affidavit in Support of Stipulation and Order, Blue Haven Nat’l Mgm’t v. Gal-
van, No. 2016CA2880 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Duval Cty. June 16, 2016).  
21. Affidavit of Melisa Handley, Groza v. Handley, No. C-16-71540 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
Carroll Cty. Aug. 9, 2016). 
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APPENDIX D: 
LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA (TALLAHASSEE) – DEFAULT JUDGMENTS WITH NO  
APPARENT ATTEMPT TO SUBPOENA ANONYMOUS POSTERS’ IDENTITIES 
 
Many of these “affidavits of diligent search” contain the same boilerplate text, 
and nothing in the affidavits indicates any attempt to do what plaintiffs in Internet 
libel cases routinely do in trying to identify defendants who have anonymously 
posted a comment on a website—subpoenaing the records of the website where the 
alleged defamation was posted, to try to get the poster’s IP address and then track 
that address down to the poster’s Internet provider. See supra notes 124–125 and 
accompanying discussion. It is possible that the plaintiffs in these cases did some-
thing else to find the defendants, but these affidavits do not indicate that. 
 
1. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Brand.Com v. Anonymous John Doe 
1, No. 2013CA003200 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Nov. 15, 2013). 
2. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Bean v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
2013CA003528 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Jan. 3, 2014). 
3. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Zammuto v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372013CA003606 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Jan. 3, 2014). 
4. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Equities First Holdings, LLC v. Anon-
ymous John Doe I, No. 372014CA000016 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Jan. 3, 
2014). 
5. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Savage v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000129 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Jan. 21, 2014). 
6. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Dhanik v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000368 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 18, 2014). 
7. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Ryburn v. Ivas, No. 372014CA000362 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 18, 2014). 
8. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Jehan v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000467 (Fla. Cit. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 21, 2014). 
9. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Barefoot Spas v. Anonymous John Doe 
I, No. 372014CA000465 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 21, 2014). 
10. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Vettese v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000462 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 21, 2014). 
11. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Salinas v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000479 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 24, 2014). 
12. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, The College Network v. Anonymous 
John Doe I, No. 372014CA000483 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 24, 2014). 
13. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Trend Sound Promoter v. Anonymous 
John Doe I, No. 372014CA000481 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 24, 2014). 
14. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Hart v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000480 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Feb. 24, 2014). 
15. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Abes of Maine v. Anonymous John 
Doe I, No. 372014CA000626 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 7, 2014). 
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16. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, GCI Solar v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA000623 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 7, 2014). 
17. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Baur, Kirk v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA000638 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 10, 2014). 
18. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Climber Com v. Anonymous John Doe 
I, No. 372014CA000656 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 11, 2014). 
19. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, IT University Online v. Anonymous 
John Doe I, No. 372014CA000657 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 11, 2014). 
20. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Western Pavers v. Anonymous John 
Doe I, No. 372014CA000702 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 17, 2014). 
21. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, HFP Capital Markets v. Anonymous 
John Doe I, No. 372014CA000765 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 25, 2014). 
22. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, IDC Technology v. Anonymous John 
Doe I, No. 372014CA000762 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 21, 2014). 
23. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Heneman v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA000759 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 21, 2014). 
24. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Dietrich v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA000760 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Mar. 21, 2014). 
25. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Shavolian v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 2014CA000845 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 1, 2014). 
26. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Nomorerack Com v. Anonymous John 
Doe I, No. 372014CA000846 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 1, 2014). 
27. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Cancilla v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA000864 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 2, 2014). 
28. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Scalamandre v. Anonymous John Doe 
I, No. 372014CA000870 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 3, 2014). 
29. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Eyler v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000879 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 3, 2014). 
30. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Glazers v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000917 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 4, 2014). 
31. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Loncar v. Anonymous John Doe I, No. 
372014CA000920 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 7, 2014). 
32. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, International Career Institute v. Anon-
ymous John Doe I, No. 372014CA000995 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 15, 
2014). 
33. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, 1Seo.Com v. Doe, Anonymous J 1 
372014CA001086 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 24, 2014). 
34. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Bezoni v. Doe, Anonymous J 1 
372014CA001095 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 25, 2014). 
35. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Shechtman v. Doe, Anonymous J 1, 
No. 372014CA001094 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 25, 2014). 
36. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Destination Wealth Management v. 
Doe, Anonymous J 1, No. 372014CA001102 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 28, 
2014). 
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37. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Brand.Com, Inc. v. Doe, No. 
372014CA001113 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 28, 2014). 
38. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Krause v. Doe, Anonymous J 1 
372014CA001111 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 28, 2014). 
39. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Jeter v. Doe, Anonymous J 1 
372014CA001207 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 8, 2014). 
40. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Whole Body Research v. Doe, Anony-
mous J 1, No. 372014CA001219 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 9, 2014). 
41. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Butler v. Doe, Anonymous J 1 
372014CA001247 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 13, 2014). 
42. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Diaco v. Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 
372014CA001287 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 19, 2014). 
43. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Holiday Cruise Line v. Doe, Anony-
mous J 1, No. 372014CA001285 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 19, 2014). 
44. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Thermospas Hot Tub Products In v. 
Doe, Anonymous J 1, No. 372014CA001318 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 21, 
2014). 
45. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, 5 North Inc v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA001340 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 23, 2014). 
46. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Brand.Com Inc v. Doe, Anonymous J 
1 372014CA001370 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 27, 2014). 
47. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Musca v. Doe, Anonymous J 1 
372014CA001390 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 28, 2014). 
48. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Avante Garde Engineering & Con v. 
Doe, Anonymous J 1, No. 372014CA001395 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. May 29, 
2014). 
49. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Newsmax Media Inc v. Doe, Anony-
mous J 1, No. 372014CA001426 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. June 2, 2014). 
50. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Saint Jude Retreats v. Doe, Anonymous 
J 1, No. 372014CA001431 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. June 2, 2014). 
51. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Brookfield Homes v. Doe, Anonymous 
J 1 372014CA001425 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. June 2, 2014). 
52. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Lvnv Funding LLC v. Doe, Anony-
mous J 1 372014CA001462 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. June 4, 2014). 
53. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Featherly v. Anonymous John Doe I, 
No. 372014CA001717 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. June 27, 2014). 
54. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Finkelstein v. Anonymous John Doe 1, 
No. 372014CA001815 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. July 11, 2014). 
55. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, The Power Co. v. Anonymous John 
Doe 1, No. 372014CA001867 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. July 17, 2014). 
56. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Wall & Assoc. Inc v. Anonymous John 
Doe 1, No. 372014CA001971 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. July 28, 2014). 
57. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Jarmin v. Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 
372014CA001999 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. July 30, 2014). 
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58. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Sobel Affiliates Inc v. Anonymous 
John Doe 1, No. 372014CA002139 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Aug. 14, 2014). 
59. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Global Connections Inc v. Anonymous 
John Doe 1, No. 372014CA002775 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Oct. 21, 2014). 
60. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Kinas v. Anonymous John Doe 1, No. 
372014CA002995 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Nov. 18, 2014). 
61. Affidavit of Diligent Search & Inquiry, Fiorentino v. Anonymous John Doe 1, 
No. 372014CA003027 (Fla Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Nov. 19, 2014). 
